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                                                       Abstract 
CREATING TURKISHNESS: AN EXAMINATION OF TURKISH 
NATIONALISM THROUGH GÖK-BÖRÜ 
                                       Güldeniz Kıbrıs 
                                    History, M.A. Thesis 
                            Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Halil Berktay 
                                   2005, ix + 113 pages 
 
 This M.A. thesis attempts to exhibit the cross-fertilization between the Pan-
Turkist and Kemalist varieties of Turkish nationalism through their definitions of 
‘Turkishness.’ In the same vein with contemporary nationalisms, the late 
Ottoman/Republican nationalist elite created ‘Turkishness’ by referring to a mythical 
past. In that creation process, the Pan-Turkist and Kemalist nationalist discourses 
historically developed in the same pool and used similar intellectual sources. Though 
their ultimate goals were different, the two varieties scrutinized very similar racist and 
nationalist references in their imaginations of Turkish identity as racially superior.  
 
In the name of revealing the similarities and differences, a Pan-Turkist journal, 
Gök-Börü [Grey Wolf] has been examined. Published and edited by Reha Oğuz 
Türkkan, the journal appeared between 1942 and 1943 as a byproduct of the special 
aggressive international environment. A discourse analysis shows that like the Kemalist 
elite, writers of the journal emphasized the superiority of the Turkish race the difference 
being that in order to ‘prove superiority,’ the latter highlighted the uniqueness of the 
Turkish race whereas the former put fingers on the similarities with the ‘Western’ 
civilization. Thus, it has been argued that Gök-Börü’s Pan-Turkist discourse was not a 
deviance from the official ideology of the Kemalists; instead it was complementary to 
it. Combining theories of nationalism with practice and focusing mainly on similarities 
among different varieties, this thesis offers an examination of Turkish nationalism from 
a broader and continuous historical perspective.     
   
Keywords: Turkish Nationalism, Racism, Gök-Börü, Turkish History Thesis, Second 
World War.   
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Özet 
TÜRKLÜĞÜ YARATMAK: GÖK-BÖRÜ ÜZERİNDEN BİR TÜRK 
MİLLİYETÇİLİĞİ İNCELEMESİ 
                                                         Güldeniz Kıbrıs 
                                      Tarih Yüksek Lisans Programı 
Tez Yöneticisi: Doç. Dr. Halil Berktay 
                                           2005, ix +113 sayfa 
 
Bu çalışmada, Pan-Türkçü ve Kemalist ‘Türklük’ tanımlarından yola çıkılarak, 
Türk milliyetçiliğinin bu iki çeşidi arasındaki karşılıklı beslenmenin sergilemenmesi 
amaçlanmaktadır. Diğer milliyetçiliklerinde olduğu gibi, Türklük kavramı da geç 
Osmanlı/erken Türkiye Cumhuriyeti milliyetçi elitlerinin mitsel bir geçmişe atıfta 
bulunmasıyla yaratılmıştır. Bu yaratım sürecinde, Pan-Türkçü ve Kemalist milliyetçi 
söylemler tarihsel olarak aynı havuzda gelişmiş ve benzer entelektüel kaynaklar 
kullanmışlardır. Nihai amaçları farklı olmasına rağmen, Türk milliyetçiliğinin iki çeşidi 
de Türk kimliğini ırksal açıdan en üstün bir şekilde tahayyül ederek neredeyse aynı 
milliyetçi ve ırkçı referansları kullanmıştır.   
 
Sözü edilen benzerlikleri ve farklılıkları açığa çıkarmak amacıyla, 1942-1943 
yılları arasında İkinci Dünya Savaşı’nın yaratmış olduğu agresif siyasi ortamın bir yan 
ürünü olarak ortaya çıkmış, Reha Oğuz Türkkan tarafından basılan Gök-Börü isimli 
Pan-Türkçü dergi örneklem olarak kullanılmıştır. Derginin söylem analizi gösterir ki; 
Kemalist elit gibi Gök-Börü yazarları da Türk ırkının üstünlüğü vurgulamıştır. 
Vurgulamadaki fark şöyledir; Kemalistler Türklerin Batı kadar üstün olduğunu 
kanıtlamaya çalışırken, Gök-Börü Türklerin kendine has ve üstün olduğunu anlatmaya 
çalışır. Bu çalışmada faklılıklar da belirtilerek, Gök-Börü’nün resmi ideolojiden bir 
sapma değil; aksine onun bir tamamlayıcısı olduğu savunulmuştur. Milliyetçilik 
teorilerini pratikle birleştiren ve farklı varyasyonlar arasındaki benzerlikleri özellikle 
vurgulayan tez, Türk milliyetçiliğinin geniş ve devamlılık arz eden tarihsel bir 
incelemesini sunmaktadır.  
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Türk Milliyetçiliği, Irkçılık, Gök-Börü, Türk Tarih Tezi, İkinci 
Dünya Savaşı 
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INTRODUCTION:                                        
 
“Alice was beginning to get very tired of sitting by her sister on the bank and of having nothing           
to do: once or twice she had peeped into the book her sister was reading, but it had no pictures or 
conversations in it, `and what is the use of a book,' thought Alice, `without pictures or 
conversations?' So she was considering, in her own mind (as well as she could, for the hot day 
made her feel very sleepy and stupid), whether the pleasure of making a daisy-chain would be 
worth the trouble of getting up and picking the daisies, when suddenly a White Rabbit with pink 
eyes ran close by her. There was nothing so very remarkable in that; nor did Alice think it so very 
much out of the way to hear the Rabbit say to itself `Oh dear! Oh dear! I shall be too late!' (when 
she thought it over afterwards it occurred to her that she ought to have wondered at this, but at the 
time it all seemed quite natural); but, when the Rabbit actually took a watch out of its waistcoat-
pocket, and looked at it, and then hurried on, Alice started to her feet, for it flashed across her 
mind that she had never before seen a rabbit with either a waistcoat-pocket, or a watch to take out 
of it, and burning with curiosity, she ran across the field after it, and was just in time to see it pop 
down a large rabbit-hole under the hedge. In another moment down went Alice after it, never once 
considering how in the world she was to get out again.”  
    
Thus, with these celebrated lines, begins the novel Alice’s Adventures in 
Wonderland by Lewis Carroll. As befits that title, the tale is about the trip of Alice, who 
follows a White Rabbit to the wonderland and meets there many imaginary characters. 
Until the very end of the tale, the reader fails to realize that the wonderland and the 
characters are in Alice’s mind. In reality, Alice created this imaginary atmosphere 
thanks to her imagination power, and also by taking some elements from the actual life 
and magnifying them. In fact, it is this mindset of magnifying, selecting from the reality 
and also sometimes transforming the image into reality which formed the discourse of 
Gök-Börü, a racist journal, published in Istanbul between 1942 and 1943 by Reha Oğuz 
Türkkan, a leading Turkish nationalist-racist.  
Aggressively contributing to attempts for defining ‘Turkishness’ through 
resonating them with the irredentist aim of ‘uniting all Turks,’ the cadre of Gök-Börü 
imagined the ideal ‘Turk’ as a member of the highest race amongst all ‘other’ human-
beings and as the developer of the earlier civilizations in Mesopotamia and Egypt. 
While creating this image, what the authors basically scrutinized was the Turkish 
History Thesis and its linguistic counterpart, the Sun-Language Theory of the 1930s. 
They, however, incorporated these sources into an anti-westernist ideological structure 
which highlighted the uniqueness of the Turkish race. On the other hand, the Kemalist 
emphasis was on the similarities with the Western civilization. The point is that for 
reaching their ultimate goals, they made very similar references through a continuous 
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emphasis on the ‘superiority of the Turkish race.’ This was not surprising since the two 
versions were both fed up from the same sources; therefore although their ultimate goals 
were different, their political strategies and starting points were the same; racial 
superiority. Thus, in the history of Turkish nationalism, the picture drawn by Gök-Börü 
is not a deviance or an exception that can simply be explained as one of the political 
maneuvers of the Second World War or a result of an effective foreign propaganda in 
Turkey. Instead it was part of a larger picture, a certain ideological background of 
Turkish and European nationalisms which created ‘national pasts’ since the nineteenth 
century-the age of nationalisms.     
 
The available literature on this period that Gök-Börü appeared is centered mainly 
on the foreign policy aspect in the rise of Pan-Turkism. First, there are extensive and 
detailed surveys of diplomatic relations during the war. Focusing on foreign policy, 
these major sources are S. Deringil’s Turkish Foreign Policy during the Second World 
War, W. Hale’s Turkish Foreign Policy: 1774-2000,  K. Karpat’s Turkey’s Politics, C. 
Koçak’s Milli Şef Dönemi: 1938-1945, B. Oran’s Türk Dış Politikası, and E. 
Weisband’s Turkish Foreign Policy: 1943-1945.1 These sources have the aim of 
presenting present a diplomatic history; therefore as it can be expected, they do not very 
much include the history of mentalities. However their concentration on foreign policy 
while mentioning Pan-Turkism, leads reader to the trap of considering the outside 
influences as the only factors that made Pan-Turkism grow in the 1940s.    
 
The point on foreign policy influences may result with another missing analysis; 
to emphasize only the changes between the Pan-Turkism of the late Ottoman Empire 
and the Kemalist nationalism. In the second group of literature are some works focusing 
on changes without much discussion on continuities. Turkism and the Soviets of C.W. 
Hostler and Pan-Turkism: From Irredentism to Cooperation by J.M. Landau are the two 
                                                 
1
 Selim Deringil, Turkish Foreign Policy during the Second World War: An ‘Active’ Neutrality 
(Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989); William M. Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy: 
1774-2000 (Portland, Oregon: Frank Cass, 2000); Kemal H. Karpat, Turkey’s Politics (Princeton, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1989); Cemil H. Koçak, Türkiye’de Milli Şef Dönemi(1938-1945): 
Dönemin İç ve Dış Politikası Üzerine Bir Araştırma (Ankara: Yurt Yayınları, 1986); Baskın Oran(ed.), 
Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşı’ndan Bugüne Kadar Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar (İstanbul: İletişim 
Yayınları, 2004); Edward Weisband, Turkish Foreign Policy(1943-1945): Small State Diplomacy and 
Great Power Politics (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1973).    
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remarkable works in this group.2 Although implying the continuity between Pan-
Turkism of the nineteenth century and Kemalist variety of Turkish nationalism in-
between lines, Landau and Hostler do not really much dwell on the issue in these two 
books. Throughout his book, Landau constantly emphasizes the difference between the 
two types of Turkish nationalism, which, according to him, is irredentism. This also 
makes his book not enough for my quest since he does not give much clue on 
continuities. 
 
The third set of works is exclusively on Turkish nationalism during this period. 
A very recent book; Mithat Atabay’s II.Dünya Savaşı Sırasında Türkiye’de Milliyetçilik 
Akımları3 has the claim of presenting a total vision of all nationalist movements of this 
period. However, the author fails to create an original contribution to already existing 
official literature. While explaining Pan-Turkism during the Second World War, he 
argues that these Pan-Turkists in Turkey were a few adventurers who were excluded 
from political power in the Republican People’s Party (RPP). His analysis of political 
power is true to some extent, but not enough for understanding the ideological mindset 
of these years.  
 
The three remarkable books that mainly guided this thesis are İki Turan by 
Nizam Önen, Turan’dan Bozkurt’a by Günay Göksu Özdoğan and Pan-Turkism in 
Turkey: A Study of Irredentism by Jacob M. Landau.4 These are good references for 
understanding the historical and ideological continuity between Kemalist nationalism 
and Turkism of the nineteenth century. Among them, Önen’s work is occupies a special 
place because it is the only book in the literature that also brings light on Turanism in 
Hungary in a comparative perspective. Other two books with their detailed historical 
survey of the Pan-Turkist variety of Turkish nationalism in Turkey were the main 
methodological guides of this thesis. Özdoğan and Landau, through these works, do not 
detach the Pan-Turkism of the 1940s from the historical development of Turkish 
                                                 
2
 Jacob M. Landau, Pan –Turkism: From Irredentism to Cooperation (Bloomington and Indianapolis: 
Indiana University Press, 1995); C.W. Hostler, Turkism and the Soviets: the Turks of the World and their 
Political Objectives (London: G. Allen & Unwin; New York, F.A.Praeger, 1957); Jacob M. Landau, Pan-
Turkism in Turkey: A Study of Irredentism (London: C. Hurst & Co., 1981). 
3
 Mithat Atabay, II. Dünya Savaşı Sırasında Türkiye’de Milliyetçilik Akımları (İstanbul: Kaynak 
Yayınları, 2005). 
4
 Nizam Önen, İki Turan: Macaristan ve Türkiye’de Turancılık (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2005); 
Günay Göksu Özdoğan, ‘Turan’dan ‘Bozkurt’a: Tek Parti Dönemi’nde Türkçülük(1931-1946)  (İstanbul: 
İletişim Yayınları, 2002a). 
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nationalism. Instead, they drew a broader framework for understanding the ideological 
formations of the Turkish nationalism. 
 
What is missing from the existing literature is not a total one, but a deep 
examination of the changes and continuities between ‘official nationalism’ of the 
‘center’ and ‘Pan-Turkism’ of the ‘margins,’ through a product of this particular era in 
which the continuities became very much visible. A detailed discourse analysis is very 
convenient for tracing common myths and images that are valuable clues for grasping 
the way that ‘Turkishness’ was constructed. Here, Turkism and Kemalist nationalism 
are not taken as the two opposite ends of Turkish nationalism, instead it is argued that 
their duality creates a symbiotic and reciprocal relationship, which taken together, helps 
to formulate a complex nationalist ideology. Hence, the main purpose of the proposed 
thesis is to fill this void in the current scholarship with a critical approach to changes 
and continuities between two different varieties of Turkish nationalism through 
analyzing basic themes which formed the tenets of Turkish nationalism. Gök-Börü, 
being the most aggressive of the journals appeared during this time, is central to our 
understanding of this creating and imagining process of ‘Turkishness’ in the 
wonderland of nationalisms.  
 
The ideological mindset that formed the discourse of Gök-Börü was the product 
of years of search for defining ‘Turkishness.’ This adventure from the Ottoman Empire 
to the Turkish Republic followed an exhausting path. It started as a central ideology in 
the nineteenth century with an attempt to ‘modernize and Westernize’ the empire, 
nurtured by the works of Russian-origin intellectuals and European orientalists. It 
became the pursuing ideology of the Turkish Republic as a state-led nationalism which 
aimed to establish Turkishness as the sole identity within the ‘national’ borders. 
Abandoning Islamic and Ottoman roots was the way chosen for claiming 
westernization. This was accompanied by the attempts to block other nations’ territorial 
demands on Anatolia. As a consequence, the search for roots through a re-writing of 
history began as the case in the European nationalist movements.  
 
The guide of the elite was Western positivism and Enlightenment; however the 
aim was to prove the existence of Turkishness in order to create attachments in the 
community; so the outcome, naturally, was a racial and pseudo-scientific definition of 
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Turkishnes. This was followed by building certain myths on the antiquity and the 
superiority of the Turks through a process of selecting, magnifying and imagining in the 
form of Turkish History Thesis and Sun-Language Theory. Besides, historians and 
politicians acted together in the building of a Turkish nation-state. It was this factor that 
equated nation and state in the Turkish case. State-led nationalism mainly carried the 
same meaning with official nationalism. Therefore ‘national history’ was written, which 
was at the same time the history of Turkish state. This constitutes an example of how 
history is politicized and used as a tool for legitimizing the existence of State and 
Nation. 
 
Indeed what the Kemalist cadre did was to search for the same things with the 
Pan-Turkists of the previous century. Therefore, although their ultimate aim was 
different, the Kemalists and the Pan-Turkists used the same sources with for serving to 
the same political strategy of creating a superior Turkish race. Therefore, neither Enver 
Pasha nor Reha Oğuz Türkkan was adventurists. Or they were as adventurist as Mustafa 
Kemal in creating a nation out of the ashes of a multi-ethnic and multi-religious empire. 
These figures were part of a broader historical framework of the development of 
Turkish nationalism. They developed in the same pool; therefore they cannot be 
detached from one another. However, on the other hand, they were also different in their 
ultimate goals. The Pan-Turkists had aims that exceeded borders of the Turkish 
Republic, whereas the elite of the new nation-state aimed to prevent the existing 
borders. The crucial point is that they both hit the road with a creation and imagination 
of Turkish race in order to block any possible challenges.  
 
The Kemalist regime purposed homogeneity within the borders, so that 
repressed alternatives through some dictatorial measures. Despite their common 
ideological references, the Pan-Turkists constituted a challenge to the central ideology 
with their irredentist aims that had the possibility of causing aggressive reactions in the 
international arena. Therefore, Pan-Turkists were excluded from political power. As a 
reaction to these measures, Pan-Turkists and other excluded ones came together in an 
anti-modernist and anti-RPP platform. For the Pan-Turkists of this time, who passed 
through a Kemalist education focused on the Kemalist history thesis, this platform was 
associations and journals. In this platform, they pursued Pan-Turkism strongly. During 
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the Second World War, they again found opportunity to voice their ideas more freely 
with a flow of Pan-Turkist journals. 
 
It was a time of the Second World War when the destruction of the Soviet Union 
by Nazi Germany seemed likely. Therefore the Kemalist elite tolerated to some extent 
the Pan-Turkist discourse in these journals. In fact some of the political and military 
elite, adopting irredentism, had already declared their support for Germany which had 
been pursuing war propaganda in Anatolia. Within that environment, the journals were 
the platforms for voicing Pan-Turkist ideals through an emphasis on the superiority of 
the Turkish race; therefore pursuing unification. In addition to the works of the late 
Ottoman Pan-Turkists, they mainly used the Kemalist History Thesis and the Sun 
Language Theory, so that they had many racist myths and symbols for defining 
‘Turkishness’ in their supply. What makes Gök-Börü of Türkkan special among these 
journals is first its aggressiveness. Including articles, poems, stories, caricatures and 
novel pieces, it was one of the most militant one of the journals of the time. In addition 
to the specific environment of the Second World War when the destruction of the Soviet 
Union by Nazi Germany seemed likely, among possible reasons for Gök-Börü’s 
aggressiveness is that it was born out of an internal bitter feud on leadership between 
Nihal Atsız and Türkkan. Therefore the journal became the stage for Türkkan in 
proving himself. Another reason that makes this journal unique is a practical one. Since 
it appeared as thirteen issues continuously without any interruption, an analysis of it is 
easier than the other journals which appeared several times with many closings and re-
openings. 
 
Thus, in this thesis, a discourse analysis of Gök-Börü is central to our 
understanding of the essence of Turkish nationalism. In the first part a theoretical 
examination of nationalism is made for highlighting the position of the thesis. In the 
second, Turkish nationalism and the efforts to define ‘Turkishness’ is traced 
historically. The common sources for Kemalist version and Pan-Turkist versions of 
Turkish nationalism are emphasized for their contributions to the creation of common 
images and myths focusing on the Turkish History Thesis. The third part begins with a 
brief examination of the authoritarian nature of the Kemalist regime in relation to its 
European counterparts, then relevant reactions to the authoritarianism at the ideological 
level are emphasized. The influence of the Second World War and the symbiotic 
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relationship between the Pan-Turkists and the Kemalist elite are emphasized. The last 
part analyzes Gök-Börü as a product of these transformations for implying the 
continuities and penetrations among late Ottoman Turkism, Kemalist nationalism and 
the Pan-Turkists of the 1940s.  
 
 To make a conceptual clarification, this thesis uses the term ‘Turkist’ in an 
inclusive fashion; for naming all of the political and intellectual elite who emphasized 
Turkish origins since the late Ottoman Empire to the 1940s. ‘Pan-Turkist’ is used for 
the ones who adopted irredentism after the borders of the Turkish nation-state had 
clearly been defined. In fact, the Ottoman Empire had more permeable borders than the 
Turkish Republic. The thesis does not deal with Pan-Turanism, which was a Magyar 
rooted national movement. However uses the term Turan for the promised land of the 
Turks. This should not be mixed with the Magyar Turan. The same applies to ideologies 
as well. 
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CHAPTER I:  
 
THEORIES OF CREATING NATIONS 
 
 "'I wonder if I've been changed in the night?  
Let me think: was I the same when I got up this morning?  
I almost think I can remember feeling a little different.  
But if I'm not the same, the next question is 'Who in the world am I?'  
Ah, that's the great puzzle!'"  
 
Lewis Carroll, Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland 
 
1.1. Imagining and myth-making: 
 
Benedict Anderson, in his book on nationalism states that “the nation is an 
imagined political community.” It is imagined, because “the members of even the 
smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear 
of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion.” According to 
Anderson, it is the sense of fraternity which keeps people together by imagining a 
certain kind of bond among them.5 Another interpretation comes from the French 
historian Ernest Renan (1823-1892). In his famous lecture of 1882, entitled Qu’est-ce 
qu’une nation?, Renan declared:  
“A nation is a large solidarity, constituted by the feeling of the sacrifices 
that one has made in the past and those that one is prepared to make in the future. 
It presupposes a past; it is summarized, however, in the present by a tangible fact, 
namely, consent, the clearly expressed desire to continue a common life. A 
nation’s existence is...a daily plebiscite.”6 
 
From a historical perspective, what Anderson and Renan shed light on is totally 
related with modernity. Before the rise of nationalism, in the Ottoman Empire, Jews, 
Albanians, Turks, and Bulgarians could have lived together. However at the end of the 
nineteenth century, as the result of various social, economic and political 
transformations; nationalist movements began to challenge the multi-ethnic, multi-
religious and multi-linguistic character of empires. This was synchronized by reducing 
                                                 
5
 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism 
(London, Verso, 1991), pp. 6-7. 
6
 Ernest Renan, “What is A Nation?” in Homi K. Bhabba (ed.), Nation and Narration (London: 
Routledge, 1990), p. 19. 
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loyalty to imperial religion and imperial dynasty. Indeed the nineteenth century was the 
century of building and constructing nations.  
 
Thus nation is a historically constructed phenomenon, it did not exist before. As 
Ernest Gellner states in his Nations and Nationalism, “nations as a natural, God-given 
way of classifying men, as an inherent... political destiny are a myth.”7 Another 
influential remark comes from Hobsbawm in The Invention of Tradition. Making a 
historical examination, very similar to Gellner’s, Hobsbawm comments that nations are 
the products of a ‘social engineering’ during the period between 1879 and 1914. 
Nationalism is the producer of that engineering process.8  
 
A path breaking historical approach to nation and nationalism is presented by 
Miroslav Hroch, a Czech historian, who made a comparative quantitative study on small 
European national movements. Arguing that national movements have three subsequent 
phases, Hroch states that in the nineteenth century firstly, national consciousness grew 
among intellectuals at cultural, literary and folkloric levels. According to his theory this 
constitutes Phase A. Following this, with pioneers and militants, national consciousness 
gains a political character and then turns to be a national movement in Phase B, whereas 
in Phase C, the movement acquires mass support and demands equal rights and self-
determination.9 Hroch’s approach is particularly useful for seeing each different stage in 
a nation-building process historically.  
 
Anderson contributes to the discussion by arguing that nations are built by 
nationalism which was born towards the end of the eighteenth century as a result of 
‘spontaneous distillation of a complex crossing of discrete historical forces.’10 He 
continues that nationalism has to be considered within the context of larger political 
structure of empires, because it came into being out of and also as a reaction to the 
religious community and the dynastic realm. The gradual decline in the legitimacy of 
these two provided the geographical and historical space for the rise of nationalisms and 
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then nations. In his analysis, Anderson particularly emphasizes the waning power of 
religious communities. According to him, this decline happened firstly as a result of 
explorations of the non-European world so Europeans’ realizing that their ‘civilization’ 
is one among many, and secondly as a result of the gradual decay in the sacred 
language, Latin, with publishing of many books in vernaculars.11 He points out that 
“what then was required was a secular transformation of fatality (of the era, created by 
various wars) into continuity, contingency into meaning.” Only nationalism, idealizing 
an immemorial past and a limitless future as opposed to the medieval conception of 
time as circular,12 could fill this place. For people living in the nineteenth century, “it is 
the magic of nationalism to turn chance into destiny.”13 It is clear that for Anderson 
nationalism fulfills the role of religion for the sense that also creates loyalties, but it is a 
secularized religion.  
 
Anderson, like Hobsbawm, Gellner or Renan, does not mention ethnic 
consciousness as a tie that makes people unite. What he particularly states along with 
the above historical happenings is print capitalism indicating the expansion of the book 
market. The eighteenth century was also a time of revival in vernaculars with 
publication of dictionaries and grammar books. The speakers of a variety of native 
languages became aware of one another as the market developed. A parallel increase in 
literacy rates, together with developments in communications enhanced the feeling of 
linguistic unification. Finally, print-capitalism fixed the language to some extent, and 
only a few languages became persistent through history.14 Here the tie that politically 
connects different people together under ‘an imagined identity’ is taken to be a macro 
element; fixed and stable language, not vernaculars themselves.  
 
Whereas Anderson stresses language as the encompassing force, Anthony D. 
Smith puts his finger on ethnic ties. According to him, that the roots of today’s modern 
nations are formed in accordance with the ethnic cores-these ‘cohesive and self-
consciously distinctive ethnies- of pre-modernity.15 In those times, people were already 
united around a common heritage, traditions and a common language and an organized 
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religion.16 At the first sight, Smith’s explanation on the existence of different ethnies in 
pre-modern times resembles Anderson’s theory on the existence of people speaking a 
variety of vernaculars before the age of nationalism. However what Smith particularly 
emphasizes is some kind of a consciousness of ‘us’ among those ethnies, which are 
connected to one another through a common culture. This kind of a feeling might have 
existed in pre-modern times, but there happened many radical changes throughout 
history such as ‘wars, conquests, immigrations, exiles, and religious conversions’17 as 
Smith admits. What these great changes created should be much diversity, or maybe 
mixing; not a great, historical and cultural continuity as Smith assumes from a longue 
dureé perception.  
 
While explaining the reasons of continuity in terms of ethnic identities, Smith 
stresses the role of state-making, military mobilization, and organized religion as the 
external forces that helped to crystallize ethnic identities and provide their continuity.18 
State-making is a modern phenomenon, therefore here Smith actually projects present to 
past as nationalists of all nationalist movements do. Besides, in the case of language, 
Hobsbawm provides some figures which are helpful for checking Smith’s theory. 
According to these figures, in 1789, 50% of French people did not speak French at all, 
and only 12-13% of the rest speak the language correctly. Besides, French was spoken 
in a central area, so in the northern and southern parts almost nobody talked French. The 
situation is the same for people living in the Italian peninsula. At the moment of 
unification in 1860, only the educated elite, meaning 2.5% of the total population were 
talking Italian.19  
 
The figures indicate that even at the time of the formation of nations, there were 
not continuously united ethnic cores. This kind of unification can only be possible with 
some kind of consent or transformation in the modern era; which is nationalism. 
Furthermore, non-existence of same linguistic culture does not necessarily lead to non-
existence of a certain nation in future. Therefore, culture cannot be the only determinant 
of a nation. On the other hand, it may also be argued that culture or ethnicity or nation 
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does not imply the same things. Same ethnic groups can live as parts of different 
nations, with similar cultures whereas the same ethnic groups living in the same nation 
can still have different cultures. This implies that ethnic consciousness or ethnic 
continuity cannot be the only reason for formation of nation; there are many cases of 
nations formed without immediate antecedents. Therefore it is also true that mentioning 
an ethnic continuity from pre-modern to modern times is almost impossible. In this 
context, Smith’s claim is problematic and is not sufficient to justify pre-modern roots of 
modern nations.  
 
Thus, the position of this thesis on the issue is that nation is a modern entity; it 
does not have a previous example of any kind like ethnic consciousness. There might 
have been communities with a shared culture and consciousness of ‘we’ and ‘other;’ but 
the notion of nation is a later phenomenon. Besides, continuities do not necessarily exist 
between pre-modern entities and modern ones. Even for contemporary nations no one 
can assume an exact continuity with the nations of fifty years before. Identities 
penetrate each other in today’s world; even feeling of attachment to a particular nation 
may become ineffective. There may lay the feeling of belonging in our minds or genes, 
but this is just ‘belonging,’ therefore it may include a family, city, school, association 
OR nation. The difference of nation is in its size. It is such a big social, political, 
economic and cultural project which was born as the result of the death of empires. 
Therefore nation is a historically constructed ‘imagined community’ which was born 
out of certain social, political and economic processes. Therefore it is not constructed in 
a magical vacuum. Besides, it is not necessarily the ethnic continuity from an 
immemorial time that keeps people together, but it is the feeling of belonging and 
relating to one another. This feeling is so strong that even in the twenty-first century 
people are willingly giving their lives for their ‘imagined community.’ In order for a 
person to do this, s/he must feel so strong and deep attachments to ‘the nation.’ This 
also shows that nations are not just built from nothingness. Creating a nation should be 
a great project of imagining. However the real challenge lies in continuing this project 
by creating those attachments in people. 
 
Walker Connor argues that people of a certain nation feel themselves related 
with one another because they believe that they are the descendants of a common 
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ancestor.20 This attachment through an assumed common bond makes people connected 
not only to living members, but also the ones who lived in the past, and who will live in 
the future.21 According to Smith, in the nineteenth century, this feeling was created 
through a rediscovery of already existing ethnic cores. In order for awakening the 
sleeping beauty as independent from any other loyalty, the ‘secular’ intellectuals 
engaged in the task of providing ‘new communal self-definitions and goals,’ and 
constructing ‘maps and moralities out of a living ethnic past.’22 Similarly, Hobsbawm 
advances that the glue for group cohesion and a strong attachment to a certain 
community and land, is created by a discovery of an ‘immemorial past’ and a ‘limitless 
future.’23 This discovery that aims to become free from an imperial and religious past 
requires an invention of tradition, “a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or 
tacitly accepted rules and of a symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values 
and norms of behavior by repetition which automatically implies continuity with the 
past.”24 Since the search was actually an invention, creation and imagination process, no 
one can argue that it had scientific basis; instead it depended on ‘ideology’ which strove 
for legitimizing of the assumed bonds with the past and future. In other words, it was a 
search in wonderland from which nationalists selected roots and at the same time 
created and imagined. 
 
  In Hroch’s analysis, national movements pass Phase A to Phase B by 
discovering their roots and so gaining a political and militant character. Referring to this 
point, for the sake of this research, a distinction should be made between nationalism of 
a national movement and nationalism of state. Hroch examines national movements 
which were born under the dominance of another political unit such as the Serbs under 
the Ottoman Empire, or the Turks under the dominance of the Russian Empire. The 
intellectual elite of these movements actually made the excavation in history and 
created myths to reawaken the ‘nation.’ Hroch’s perspective is somewhat a bottom to 
top one. These nationalisms are ‘state-seeking’25 ones in Tilly’s words. 
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However there is also the other side. Nationalism comes to the scene also as 
‘state-led’26 one, as a political strategy adopted by the modern state, actually by the 
political elite of the modern state, to obviate dismantling of the state against newly 
rising nationalist movements that Hroch takes as the unit of analysis. In other words, a 
top-down nationalism, which is called as ‘official nationalism’ by Seton-Watson,27 
arose as a political response to ‘unofficial’ popular nationalisms that were mainly 
directed against imperial center. The aim is to ‘super-nationalize’ the small national 
movements. Anderson presents the most famous examples for this; “Russia applied a 
fatal policy of Russification, London tried to Anglicize Ireland, Imperial Germany tried 
to Germanify its share of Poland, Imperial France imposed French on Italian-speaking 
Corsica.”28 As the examples imply, official nationalism imposes a certain ‘high 
culture’29 in Gellner’s words, and a supreme, homogeneous and central identity, which 
is justified through various invented traditions.  
 
While publicizing the imagined identity; ethnic bonds, an ancient land, a 
common language, common traditions and blood tie are fetishized30 against alternatives. 
This leads to naturalization of certain cultural attributions as if they existed for all times. 
The ‘naturalization’ actually provides the transition from history to myth. Then, as 
Barthes states, around the myths, a world without contradictions is built. On the way of 
coming up with some attributions to culture, myths essentialize and also naturalize what 
is visible without looking at the invisible.31 The results become very simple then and 
words speak for themselves; good is only good, superior is only superior.  
 
There are a number of recurrent myths in every nationalist narrative. Anthony 
Smith identifies the most common ones. These are; the antiquity of the particular nation, 
the genesis of it, the golden age when this nation reached to the highest level of 
civilization and heroism, the period of decay resulted from degeneration in the essence, 
and finally the awakening by a national hero.32 These myths are centered on ‘race’ as 
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their ‘given’ reference point. Being itself a myth, race is used to distinguish community 
from other communities and to legitimize community’s existence. This race-
understanding is common in almost every nationalist ideology. An analysis of it 
provides the major clue for grasping the real essence of nationalist movements. 
 
 
1.2. “Nihil Humanum a me alienum puto:”33 
 
Creating an ethnic identity firstly requires establishing cultural and institutional 
distinction between ‘we’ and ‘they.’ Connor declares that construction of ‘we,’ as 
sharing common bonds and a common identity, starts from defining the ‘Other.’34 
Historically, this method has been used by every nation-building ideology.35 Balibar 
adds that for building a nation, racism, which very strongly puts forward the difference, 
is a needed tendency, in either a covert or open manner, in all nationalisms.36 It is this 
process of nationalization that creates ethnic foundations to nations.37 Therefore, racism 
comes out as a kind of strategy; not different from nationalism, but a complementary to 
it.38 Therefore ethnic and civic nationalisms should not be taken as mutually exclusive. 
39
 What changes is the degree of emphasis which depends on whether this nationalism 
has a territory or not.  
 
If ‘nation’ does not have a certain territory with its limits, the attachments will 
rise towards race very smoothly. In the case of Central and Eastern European 
nationalisms, particularly that of people who were part of multi-national empires, or 
were politically disunited and scattered like Germans or Italians, rather than having state 
within its territorial limits, race was mainly emphasized as the basis of nationhood.40 
Not surprisingly, Pan Movements, which were very intensely aiming at promoting the 
solidarity or union of the group physically present in different states, were born in this 
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geography.41 These ‘state-seeking’ nationalisms at first had to prove that there existed 
certain ‘nation’ and they were aiming its unity. However they did not have the territory, 
so they had to use another strong and deep attachment; this was race. The particularity 
of these nationalisms, thus nurtured race-theories and ideology. In the nineteenth 
century it was mainly the German Romantics, who contributed to the development of 
race-theories with their longing for a unity for their ‘stateless’ ‘race’ living under the 
domination of different states.  
 
 Johann Gottfried von Herder (1744-1803) was one of the most influential 
Romantics. Opposing to the universalistic and rationalistic fetish of the Enlightenment, 
Herder puts emphasis on ‘soul’ of a nation instead of a territorial unity. According to 
him, some authentic features of a community like language and culture make it 
organically connected. Then volk, meaning people living within natural boundaries with 
a common soul, common identity and common language come to realize.42 Barnard 
argues that Herder’s ideas were a call for ethnic communities which did not have 
separate states. This is valid, because Herder stresses the uniqueness of communities, 
and in a way, gives them hope for unification. Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1764-1814) and 
Heinrich von Treitschke (1834-1896), later politicized and militarized Herder’s 
conception of volk. The emphasis on race was pushed within that ideological mindset 
and then ‘the fatal equation of language, state and nation’43 came to the scene as 
political implications. 
 
Thus the links between racism and nationalism become more obvious. Race and 
language had been interpreted as the indicators of the same things. As an example to 
this, Turan was invented for naming a language family which included Finnish and 
Magyar. It was thought that this was a sign that these people, who are now living 
indifferent areas, were united at some point in time. When they migrated to other places 
from their homelands, this unity was disrupted.44 Besides, as Hobsbawm underlines, the 
attempts of purifying languages also reinforced that racial character.45  
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In the case of state-led nationalisms, race comes out as one of the elements of 
the state-led imposition process. When the ‘state’ stretches the tight body of its nation to 
the whole with either factual or fictitious roots, it enters into an uneasy and unsmooth 
process. Alternative nationalisms or the ‘traditional groups’46 or the ‘low culture’ may 
show resistance to the supreme and homogeneous identity. The creator of the nation, the 
State, then adopts racism for repressing heterogeneous elements by exalting the 
supreme identity in a hierarchy of races.47 Actually, the sources of both state-seeking 
and state-led nationalisms are the same. The state-led imposition process may include 
pseudo-scientific works for ‘proving’ antiquity and superiority of the ‘nation.’ State-
seeking ones also can benefit from these studies for creating certain motivation for unity 
and establishing a state.  
     
 The pseudo-scientific works at first came from Europe. In fact, racism’s basic 
idea of classifying people was developed through the Enlightenment era. This depended 
on the impact of Reconnaissance, during which European men, literally, saw other 
people, and tried to come up with some explanations for difference between ‘we’ and 
‘they.’48 The ‘universalistic’ values of Christianity49 along with the idea of ‘progress,’ 
gave birth to ‘white men’s burden’ of ‘civilizing’ the whole world. The ‘discovered’ 
ones did not have the capability of contributing to this process of ‘creating a 
civilization,’ therefore they had to be sacrificed. In other words; the weak and incapable 
had to be eliminated for ‘progress’50 as Darwin argued in his The Origin of Species by 
means of Natural Selection or the Survival of Favored Races in the Struggle for Life in 
1859. 
  
 Accordingly, the nineteenth century witnessed the development of many new 
sciences, such as philology, anthropology, criminology, and psychology, through which 
the classical division of people into color-groups was nurtured by shape-division. The 
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occupation was to classify mankind from the highest ‘race’ to the lowest and attribute 
differences in physical appearances to behavioral characteristics. Behaviors were 
assumed to be resulted from blood and genetic heritage; therefore the ‘inferior races’ 
were thought to be that kind because of their blood so as the superior ones.51 Measuring 
became an increasingly common method to find out differences. One of the remarkable 
‘scientific’ studies was that of W.F. Edwards, Des Caractéres Physiologies des Races 
Humaines Considéerées dans Leur Rapport avec l’Histoire (1829). Looking at different 
‘races’ in France, Edwards asserted that the form and proportions of the skull constitute 
the principal test of race.52 By essentializing physical characteristics what race theorists 
did was to create models of humanity and naturalize differences among people. Thus 
they actually constructed myths to either to justify inequalities, or to understand them.    
 
 The French Revolution had emphasized equality of Man without any distinction 
in rank, creed or race. Race theorists, on the other hand, argued for inequality as a 
reaction to the universalistic values of the Revolution. The interesting thing is that the 
foremost runners of race theories also appeared in France. This might be a clue that the 
values of French Revolution were not accepted by French people as a whole, the 
oppositions were still powerful, or maybe not much time had passed yet. There is also 
the fact that the French monarchy was restored after 1815. Then the race revived in 
French politics with works of history and political theory for crushing those of the 
Revolution.53 Therefore the revival of race theories synchronized with the rise of 
nationalisms. What these theories did was to response liberté, egalité and fraternité 
motto of nationalist movements and to make those ‘ethnic groups’ remember their 
places in the model of humanity.   
  
 Race-thinking actually became a convention in scholarship, literature and 
journalism of the nineteenth century, then.54 Gustave Le Bon (1841-1931) was one of 
those theorists who played the prominent role in the development of race as an 
ideology. He highlighted psychological, mental, and moral characteristics of a ‘nation’ 
as determining factors of whole civilization. In his Les lois Psychologies de l’evolution 
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de Peuples (1894), he argued that each race has its own characteristics which are 
inherited from the ancestors. Equality and mixing with communities lead to the 
degeneration of this spirit.55 Similarly to Herder, he considers race as ‘soul of a nation.’ 
Arthur de Gobineau (1816-1882) approaches to the issue with the classical color-
character pair. In his L’Essai Sur L’inégalite (1853), the starting point is the division of 
the mankind into three. The first one is white, which is noble, superior, intelligent, and 
energetic, the second is stable and fertile and lastly the black is sensual and artistic.56 
According to Gobineau, it is only when two of these races mix, civilization comes into 
being. However as the time passes the ruling caste becomes more contaminated and the 
civilization falls. The Essai was read by many intellectuals during Gobineau’s lifetime. 
Among those names, Barzun states Renan, Taine, Nietzsche, Wagner and Albert 
Sorel.57 The names indicate that Gobineau was popular at least among intellectuals. 
Gobineau connects decadence to the decrease in the number of white caste, which is 
assumed to be best presented by German and Scandinavians.58 It was this idea of 
Gobineau that guided the policies of Second and Third Reich. Indeed, Gobineau 
signifies a feudal reaction to the universal citizenship of France; which according to him 
led to the fall of ‘Western civilization.’  
  
Thus, during the nineteenth century, German Romantics’ idea of the soul of a 
nation and ‘scientific’ studies were the available sources for every kind of nationalisms. 
Therefore it is not possible to think of any nationalism away from these, so that it is not 
possible to think any nationalism without including some racist aspect. To make it clear, 
racism assumes homogeneity and uniformity. Nationalisms exploit this idea for 
distinguishing themselves from others, claiming continuity, so that proving the nation’s 
existence. Ideal types of Kohn as ethnic and civic, fail here. 
  
The imposition of a constructed national identity was realized through a 
developed communications network and also new innovations, such as mandatory 
primary education, public ceremonies; and the mass production of public monuments 
for reproduction of official nationalism everyday and everywhere.59 A recent work, The 
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Myth of the Military Nation by Altınay, shows that universal conscription should also be 
considered within that framework.60 Through these mechanisms, “what they did was 
‘stretch the short, tight skin of the nation over the vast body of empire”61-in fact that of 
the defined nation. Billig’s study of Banal Nationalism is deserved to be mentioned 
here. According to him, the imposition process is a never-ending one.62 The absolute 
identity continuously reproduces itself through above-mentioned mechanisms. As 
Balibar states the main problem lies in reproduction, because the aim is to create a 
‘unity’ by repressing partialities since they can constitute challenges.63 In newspapers, 
journals, music, sports, cinema, advertisements, literature, educational institutions, 
almost everywhere, the traces of that imposition could be found. The official 
nationalism continuously re-proves itself with various national symbols, images and 
myths. When a conflict emerges, an automatic fast fabrication of myths begins. The 
members are made remembered their origins, their identities. Then nation, the 
constructed identity, is re-naturalized with references to glorious past and limitless 
future. 
 
In order to provide absolute control, state elites repress any other alternative 
opinion tools; like associations and newspapers whether they are pursuing a different 
nationalism or not. However if the essence of official nationalism is very similar to one 
of these unofficial ones, then this alternative one can also gain significance whenever it 
finds an opportunity. The peculiarity is that it conciliates with the ideology of the center 
in many aspects since they mainly scrutinize the same ‘historical’ and ‘scientific’ 
sources. They may adopt similar discourses; one being milder than other, and also 
employ same symbols and myths. Thanks to these similarities in their essence, it turns 
out to be an interesting juxtaposition if state-led and state-seeking ones, or previously 
repressed one and the central one meet. 
 
Turkish nationalism, historically, did not follow a different development. It was 
on the scene as a state-led movement during the late Ottoman/early Republican era. 
There was also an independently developed variety of Turkish nationalism, the state-
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seeking nationalism of the Turks under the Russian dominance. These two fertilized one 
another in the establishment of new nation-state in Anatolia without any Islamic and 
Ottoman heritages. In order to create attachments to the territory and among the people, 
the Kemalist regime engaged in re-writing ‘national’ history and disseminating it within 
the borders of Anatolia through claiming the ownership of many other civilizations.  
The interesting thing was that in this process the sources of the regime and those of 
state-seeking nationalist movements were the same. Their basic aims were to prove the 
existence of Turks in the world since antiquity. Actually, two varieties nurtured one 
another although one was a challenge to State’s ‘limited’ nationalism because of 
irredentist aims. The relation between the two varieties, of course, did not make them 
entirely the same. They were the same, but they were also different; one established a 
nation-state with limited borders no matter what some of its people might have been 
longed for; whereas the other, both ideologically and politically, aimed to build a 
Turkish Empire, let us say, by incorporating the Turkish-speaking lands of other states. 
In the case of Gök-Börü, the cross-fertilization can be realized with a close examination. 
However for a truer analysis, one should not fall into the trap of only emphasizing 
similarities; therefore should keep in mind that despite them, the two versions did not 
become completely the same since the ultimate political goals were different.   
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CHAPTER II: 
 
 
CREATING TURKISHNESS: FROM OTTOMAN EMPIRE TO TURKISH 
REPUBLIC 
 
“Dile geldi BOZKURTlar, başladılar duaya, 
Uluları haykırdı: Haydin Kızıl Elmaya 
… 
Kızılelma, diyordu, özgeye şan verenler, 
Kızılelma diyordu, göğe çıkan Atatürk… 
… 
Kızılelma diyordu, çadır söken bir Hakan 
Kızılelma, diyordu, dökülen her damla kan…” 
                                                              
                                                              R. Arda, Gök-Börü (13: 20 May 1943)  
 
 
The transition from the multi-ethnic Ottoman Empire to the nation-state of 
Turkish Republic was also a transition from an Islamic and imperial heterogeneous 
conception of identity to a secular and homogeneous one. During this period, 
‘Turkishness,’ as ‘a secular religion’ that Anderson may call, aimed to substitute Islam. 
It was redefined and freed from its previous meanings referred to Turkish-speaking 
Muslims or ignorant villagers. Instead, it was attributed certain political, historical and 
cultural meanings. From then on the basic definition can be assumed as the following; 
‘Turks are a glorious and superior nation existing since an immemorial time, they were 
the creators of the earliest civilizations. However now they are now going through a 
period of recess because of they have been subjugated by foreign cultures. They should 
return to their origins to find their uncorrupted essence, and so should end this 
accidental period of decadence.’    
  
The important point is that all nationalisms use similar elements in their 
definitions for their ‘nation.’ They hit the road with antiquity, then heroic features and 
superiority follow as the second element, a golden age is referred as the third one, and 
lastly in order to justify what happened now, ‘a period of somnolence,’64 in Gellner’s 
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terminology, comes to the scene. Now the mission is very much determined; to save the 
nation from that period. In our case Gök-Börü, ‘Turkishness’ was built exactly on these 
points which Kemalist History Thesis also made references to as its building blocks. 
This definition, of course, did not suddenly appear in a vacuum without any basis. As it 
was in other nationalisms, it was produced through various cultural, political and social 
transformations. Historically, an Islamic and imperial reflex played the big role in not 
only creation of that definition but also its imposition over the ‘nation.’ Thus this part of 
the thesis traces the creation of the elements of Turkishness in Gök-Börü through late 
Ottoman and early Republican intellectual and political life in order to grasp the 
environment that prepared Gök-Börü’s discourse and drew its intellectual map.  For the 
intellectuals, the focus is going to be on the ones that Gök-Börü considered as its 
‘leaders.’ 
    
 
2.1. From ‘Ottomanness’ to ‘Turkishness:’   
 
The first attempts for defining ‘Turkishness’ were largely products of nineteenth 
century modernization of the Ottoman Empire. As was the case in Europe, 
transformation to a centralized modern state was realized through various reforms in 
military, education and bureaucracy. Most importantly, a Constitution was adopted to 
reinstall the legitimacy of the empire which had been lost because of waning power in 
economics and politics. New conceptions for citizenship pursuing equality of rights for 
all ethnic and religious groups living in the empire formed the novel foundation of the 
Constitution. With a territorial understanding of nationalism,65 the feeling of belonging 
to the same territory, regardless of religion was aimed to be created.  
 
Namık Kemal (1840-1888) was one of the prominent intellectuals that thought 
on this new understanding of belonging. In his writings, Namık Kemal tried to create a 
notion of Ottoman citizenship which began to incorporate new elements combining 
Islam, Ottoman and Turkish loyalty expressed towards dynasty. Geography was his first 
reference point, and then he emphasized emotional attachment to common ancestors 
and common past. For this purpose, in his play Vatan yahut Silistre (1873), he narrated 
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the military valor and heroic deeds of the ‘Turk.’ Namık Kemal used the term ‘Ottoman 
nation’ interchangeably with the ‘Turks.’66 Therefore, his use of ‘Turk’ does not imply 
that he had had this ethnic consciousness of being a Turk. He was an ‘Ottoman,’ but one 
emotionally attached to the land of the Ottoman dynasty. Thus he was thinking within 
an imperial framework; not within a national one. Despite this Namık Kemal’s 
emphasis on la patrie was adopted as one of the guiding principles of Kemalist 
nationalism and also the Pan-Turkism of the 1930s and 1940s. For the Kemalists la 
patrie was Anatolia and it needed to be defended, but for the Pan-Turkists it was Turan. 
 
The creation of a common identity had come with centralization measures. 
State-seeking nationalist movements and also some peripheral communities like the 
Kurdish tribes challenged this inclusive identity of Ottoman and this centralization.67 
The reasons were carefully analyzed by Şerif Mardin. He proclaims that, in the Ottoman 
Empire, “the building blocks were not completely integrated.”68 Therefore, the 
‘modernizing’ reforms could not reduce already existing tension in the society; instead 
the tension increased more between social classes also within the architects of the state-
seeking nationalist movements.69 Consequently, it was proved that creating an Ottoman 
citizen as including people from different ethnicities, was not a feasible option in this 
age of nationalisms.  
 
By the 1860s, Ottomanism had already been challenged by Islamism, which 
aimed to unify of the Islamic world and create an Islamic ‘nation.’ Adopted later by 
Abdulhamit II as the political ideal, Islamism had also the dimension of reacting to the 
Ottomanism’s emphasis on equality among people regardless of their religion. Besides, 
with large deportations of Muslim people following the gradual independence of the 
Balkan lands a much more Islamic population came to be realized within the remaining 
Ottoman lands. Abdulhamit also took some Islamist measures, for instance the 
institution of Caliphate again gained importance in the political arena. However 
unification of all Islamic lands was a hard project, in fact ‘West’ was also following an 
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expansionist ideology, therefore the interests of the center of the Ottoman Empire and 
‘western’ interests clashed.70 That is to say, the ideal became useless with that conflict. 
 
While the Ottoman elite was trying to ‘save the empire’ with reforms that 
included creation of an Ottoman citizen or creation of an ‘Islamic nation,’ some 
European orientalists wrote a number of books on Turkish race and Turkish language in 
an admired manner. These books were largely read by the Ottoman elite. Some of them 
were even translated into Ottoman Turkish. In addition to political situation, it was these 
sources that helped to the creation of an image of ‘Turkishness,’ when other identities 
became obsolete. The most influential of those sources were; Histoire Générale des 
Huns, des Turcs, des Mongoles, et autres Tartares Occidenteaux (1756-1758) by Joseph 
de Guignes (1721-1800), A Grammar of the Turkish Language (1832) by Arthur 
Lumley Davids (1852-1913), which was the first systematic survey of Turkish 
language, Travels in Central Asia (1864) and Sketches of Central Asia (1867) by 
Arminius Vambéry (1832-1913), which was on  the common origins of Turkic groups 
as belonging to one race, but subdivided according to physical traits and customs, and 
l’histoire de l’Asie (1896) by Leon Cahun (1841-1900), which stressed the role of Turks 
in carrying ‘civilization’ to Europe, as a part of greater Turanid race that included the 
Japanese and Fin as well.71  
 
Within these books the most popular one among the Turkists was that of Cahun. 
Şerafettin Turan, in his book on intellectual sources of Mustafa Kemal, declares Cahun 
as one of the books that Mustafa Kemal read.72 Türkkan, editor of Gök-Börü, also states 
for himself that he was mainly influenced by Cahun’s work during his high school 
years.73 Besides Ziya Gökalp, another prominent Turkists writes that Cahun’s book was 
the first book that he bought when he came to İstanbul. According to Gökalp, this book 
was seemed to be written for encouraging the Pan-Turkist mefkure, ideal.74 The first 
reason for this kind of a great influence rested on Cahun’s thesis on Islam. According to 
Cahun, after Turks adopted Islam, they forgot about their own culture and took Arabic 
and Persian elements. This led to their degeneration. Here Cahun’s negative emphasis 
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on Islam became the guiding principle for both the Pan-Turkist and Kemalist varieties 
of Turkish nationalism. Cahun served them to ‘erase’ Islamic Seljukid and Ottoman 
past. The second reason for this influence lies in Cahun’s reference to Turks as honest 
administrators and militant soul.75 These elements constituted the basis for such myths 
like Turks were a military nation since antiquity. 
 
However a close examination of Cahun’s book reveals that there are some 
missing points in the pictures of Türkkan, Gökalp or Atatürk. As Taner Timur states, 
Cahun also makes many negative points about Turks. For instance, he declares that 
“Turks are emotional people who cannot use their reasons…They, together with the 
Mongols, existed in history not as the founder of any civilization; but as the 
intermediaries between Chinese and Iranian civilizations. They could not adopt any of 
them since they were thinking pragmatically.”76 This part of Cahun’s argument was 
totally excluded in the Late Ottoman and Early Republican case. It seems that a 
selection from the source is on the scene. This example displays one of the ways that 
‘national’ history was being written. Here it is also worth mentioning that Cahun was 
not really a scientific source. He was known as a man of letters; and despite this, his 
book was taken as reference. It can be also said that ‘creating a nation’ itself is an 
adventure, so Cahun might have been very well suited for fulfilling that mission.    
 
Hence the common emphasis in these books is the Central Asian origins of the 
Turks. At this point another question to should be asked; why were those Europeans 
interested in Turks? It is known that they were orientalists and orientalists were being 
interested in the empire since the sixteenth century. They were considering the Ottoman 
Empire as the representative of the despotic face of the East. However in the nineteenth 
century, some of the orientalists turned to sources; particularly the Chinese archives. Of 
course making research in records did not change their classical thinking of the world as 
being divided in two parts. The point is that this group was not just writing stories on it; 
but was ‘interested’ in the Ottoman Empire as ‘a different culture’ in the nineteenth 
century. Very basically orientalism considers ‘East’ as the spiritual. In this age of 
nationalisms this kind of an ‘interest’ can be the result of searching for the lost spirit. 
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This gives clues for drawing the whole picture. At this time, not only the Ottomans was 
in an identity crisis, but also the Europeans were trying to define themselves through a 
search for new references.   
 
At the center of this intellectual and political environment, some of the Young 
Ottomans were writing on ‘Turkish’ civilization and language as well. Among them, Ali 
Suavi (1838-1878) occupied an important place. Combining two elements in his 
definition, he stated that Turks were the foundational element of the Ottoman Empire77 
and ‘Turk’ was a race that also included people living in Central Asia. Ali Suavi’s 
formulation is a good example of duality in the minds of the day’s intellectuals. There 
were other intellectuals who displayed this dilemma between empire and nation-state.  
Ahmet Vefik Paşa, in his Lehçe-i Osmani (1890) claimed that the Ottoman Turkish was 
originated from the same source with the Central Asian dialects. Ahmet Mithat, on the 
other hand, called Central Asia as the fatherland of the Turks.78  The other significant 
work was Kamus-u Türki (1889) by Şemseddin Sami (1850-1904), through which Sami 
argued that speaking the same language is the first and foremost condition of belonging 
to the same race.79 Two other significant works were Les Turcs Anciens et Modernes 
(1869) by Mustafa Celaleddin Pasha (Constantin Borzecki) (1826-1875) and Tarih-i 
Alem (1876) by Süleyman Paşa (1838-1892). The first one extensively dealt with racial 
origins of the Turks and considered the Turks and Europeans as belonging to a great 
Touro-Aryan race, whereas Mongols belonged to another race. This work was very 
much influenced from Guignes. The second work also used the information in Guignes 
in order to glorify ‘militaristic qualities of the Turkish nation.’ Lastly Necib Asım is 
worth mentioning. He translated Cahun’s book into Ottoman Turkish in 1896, then 
published it in 1900.80  
 
  These sources by the Ottomans were mostly written after the European ones. 
This indicates that the earliest sources about the origins were created by the orientalists. 
The Ottoman intellectuals made use of them either by translating or using information 
already presented. The research of the Ottomans was mainly shaped by these works 
then. In other words, most of the Ottoman intellectuals began to discover or create their 
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identities through Europe’s gaze and most of them did not make any further research. 
Seeing themselves through European orientalist eyes might have led to a feeling of self-
hate. This might have contributed to ‘westernization’ ideal and at the same time to the 
ignorance of the continuity between new Turkish Republic and the Ottoman Empire. 
The sources were really useful for serving to this end of rejection. On the other hand, 
they were also used for correcting the barbaric and Islamic image of the Turks in the 
‘West.’ This was a product of the feeling of inferiority in front of the ‘West.’ Then the 
combination of those to led to a complete and fast rejection.  
 
Furthermore, the political and intellectual currents within the empire were 
nurtured by Russian-originated intellectuals. Independently from what was going on in 
the Ottoman Empire, Pan-Turkist nationalism developed within the Russian Empire 
among Turkic-speaking people. With their migration to the Ottoman lands following the 
Soviet Revolution, these intellectuals became very active in Ottoman cultural and 
political life.81 One of them was Ismail Gasprinski (1851-1914), a Crimean Turk. He 
emphasized a spiritual and linguistic unity of all the Turks of the Russian Empire. His 
motto was ‘Unity in language, thought and action.’82 Another prominent figure was 
Ağaoğlu Ahmet (1869-1939), an Azerbaijani who published Türk Yurdu, the journal of 
Turkish intellectuals.83 This variety of Turkish nationalism had developed in its specific 
conditions. Turkic speaking people were seen as ‘prisoner Turks,’ so that they should be 
saved somehow. This element also contributed to the formation of another myth in 
Turkish nationalism.  
 
Besides, the ideas of these Russian-originated intellectuals presented the 
Ottomans another solution to give an end to empire’s collapse; unification of all Turks. 
Hence Turcology works of Europe and the books of Ottoman intellectuals were joined 
by Pan-Turkism, which came to the scene as the last imperial option in front of the 
Ottoman political elite. Its aim for unification was the guiding principle of the Pan-
Turkists of the 1930s and 40s. In the case of Kemalist nationalism, Pan-Turkist policies 
showed themselves especially during the Second World War when Germany was in war 
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with the Soviet Union. Before this time it is hard to get any example of irredentism-
inspired discourse in official ideology. The most interesting point is that many of the 
Pan-Turkist intellectuals of the late Ottoman Empire continued to situate themselves 
among the leading cadre of the new Turkish Republic. This did not constitute a 
contradiction in their minds, because they were all developed through the same pool. In 
that case, although their ultimate ends were different; both Kemalist nationalism and the 
Pan-Turkism of the 1930s and 40s used the same sources, writings of the late Ottoman 
early Republican Pan-Turkists or writings of European orientalists, as their references. 
This is sign of continuity and complementariness in these varieties of Turkish 
nationalism along with disattachments among them.   
 
Among the Russian-originated intellectuals, Yusuf Akçura (1878-1935), a Tatar 
historian, was the most important one to affect Turkish nationalism. He was the first 
intellectual that systematized the transformation of the Turkist movement from Phase A 
to B, meaning from a cultural into a political one. In his article entitled Üç Tarz-ı 
Siyaset (Three Systems of Government) (1904), Akçura clearly stated that Pan-Turkism 
is the best strategy for the Ottoman Empire. He rejected Ottomanism, because it 
minimized the rights of the Turks; and Pan-Islamism, since it alienated non-Muslim 
groups in the Ottoman Empire.84 In that case, for him, Turkism appears as the only 
viable opportunity. He argues that a union of all Turkic groups, meaning all Turks 
speaking Ural-Altay or Fin-Magyar languages should be established. In that political 
system, Turkey should be at the center.85 For Akçura Pan-Turkism comes as a matter of 
fact.  
  
Here Akçura still thinks in the notion of an empire and argues against the 
universalistic concept of French citizenship; which was based on will, not race. 
According to him, this kind of an understanding is illegitimate in the case of the 
Ottoman Empire.86 Islamism also will work for the disadvantage of the empire because 
of its internal historical conflicts. The most useful solution is to establish a union of 
Turks based on common traditions, language, religion and also common heritage of 
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state-making.87 In that context, Akçura uses Turan for referring to Central Asian 
origins; not as a romantic symbol or ethnic nationalism.88 For him Turan is the basis of 
the political project, not a romantic myth.   
 
Akçura makes a secular definition of Turkishness. Therefore his race concept 
was different than that of the popular Europeans; such as Gobineau’s. According to 
Akçura, race signifies a common ethnic and cultural heritage, so that it is distinguishing 
criteria. Together with language, traditions and religion; race constitutes the 
commonalities that is going to provide Pan-Turkist unity. In that case the non-Turks 
should be Turkified.89 Therefore concepts like blood tie, pure race, and the superiority 
of a certain race do not really mean anything to Akçura. His approach is an analytical 
one that shows the possible strategies. It is, in a way, an outline of the nationalist 
project. 90 He does not deal with any romantic ideal, so does not really establish his 
ideas on certain myths. Instead, like an economist Akçura focuses on the possibility of 
the project. 
 
Another important intellectual that became the guide for the later nationalists is 
Ziya Gökalp (1875-1924). He is the one that intensely romanticizes a historical land, 
ancient origins, along with a silence period which would result with awakening. In fact, 
he was quite influenced by the German Romantics. According to him, nation is a 
community of people who speak the same language, who have gone through the same 
education, who have religious, moral and aesthetic ideals, and who have the same 
culture and religion.91 This definition of nation very much resembles Herder’s Volk. 
Herder also considers culture and language as the foundations of a nation.92 Based on 
this definition, Gökalp argues that no nation is homogeneous in terms of race. Therefore 
there is not any relation between racial characteristics of a particular nation and national 
characteristics. He emphasizes language as the hallmark of nationality and regards 
linguistic independence as a necessary condition to political independence.93 In that 
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case, for Gökalp, empires, since they were constituted by many nations, are doomed to 
collapse. Nationalism should be the supreme ideal for nations. In the unity, individual 
does not have an absolute value. In that case, unification of all Turks, formation of 
Turan is the ideal, but a distant one; because it can be realized gradually.94 He declares 
that there are steps for Turan. The first is Turkeyism which in fact was realized, the 
second is Oghuzism meaning unification of Oghuz Turks along with Turkmens of 
Azerbaijan, Iran and Khwarizm and the last step, Turan which is the unification of all 
Turkic-speaking people, such as the Yakuts, Kırghiz, Uzbeks, Kipchaks and Tatars who 
speak the same language with the Turkish people, but not have the identical culture. 
These form the Greater Turkestan or Turan.95 In Gökalp’s Turan, there is not a place for 
Hungarians or Magyars. 
 
On the way realizing unification, Gökalp attributes a functional aspect to Islam. 
In his collection of articles published in 1918 under the title of Türkleşmek, 
İslamlaşmak, Muasırlaşmak, he states that Islamic religious beliefs can be a unifying 
factor of different Turks living in different areas. Here it is worth mentioning that 
Gökalp pursues mainly the religious aspects of Islam; not the political ones, such as 
political, legal and social traditions. Gökalp, like other intellectuals of his time, tries to 
conciliate modernization and nationalist project. He carries the duality of becoming like 
‘West,’ but being lost in it. Gökalp’s solution was that Turks should accept from the 
West only material achievements and scientific methods. According to Gökalp; the rest, 
other than religion and material things, should be thoroughly Turkish. This includes all 
elements of culture, particularly emotional and moral values.96 No matter its feasibility, 
this point of Gökalp became the guide for later nationalists. 
 
For Gökalp and most of the later intellectuals, nationalism had two sides; 
material and spiritual. The interesting thing is that material is always associated with 
‘modern,’ ‘western’ or ‘rational.’ However spiritual stands for traditional. Considering 
‘modernization’ and ‘westernization’ as inevitable, late Ottoman-early Republican 
intellectuals tried to combine two elements; ‘nationalism’ and ‘westernization.’ It is of 
course debatable to what extent this project became successful, but it is very important 
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to note that this mindset was resulted from the fatal conflictual relation between 
becoming like the ‘west’ and becoming like ‘us.’ For the late Ottoman-early Republican 
intellectuals, as it was the case for many of the European nationalists, nationalism meant 
returning to origins and rediscovering the lost essence. Therefore particularly in the 
Ottoman-Turkish case, nationalism was taken as something related with traditions 
although it is a modern phenomenon, it was different than modernization; sometimes 
completing it but sometimes against to it since ‘westernization’ could degenerate the 
culture, the real essence. This love-hate relationship with the West has been an 
indispensable myth in Ottoman-Turkish intellectual and political life. 
 
Furthermore, Gökalp believes that Turks were now in a period of silence since 
they were drifted away from their national traditions because of the impact of other 
cultures. Therefore they should ‘return to their origins.’ This can be done through a 
search for authentic cultural values. Here, similarly to Herder, Gökalp emphasizes the 
value of ‘uncorrupted folk.’ In order to reach the real essence, popular folk’s culture, its 
arts, crafts, morals and customs should be examined. Accordingly, Gökalp glorifies the 
ancient Turks, pre-Islamic states, and heroes like Attila, Chingiz Khan in addition to 
some of the Ottoman Sultans. With his emphasis on the pre-Islamic origins, Gökalp 
contributed to the rejection of Islamic roots although Gökalp himself was taking Islam 
as one of the founding elements of the Turkish nation. Gökalp declares that these 
conquerors tried to unite all Turkish communities; they did not have any other aim like 
oppressing. Turks has that mission of realizing highest virtues such as hospitality, 
modesty, and courage.97 Gökalp-kind of glorification of the Turks as the heroic peace-
makers; not barbaric ones, was one of the recurrent themes used by both the first 
generation of the Turkists, the Kemalist History Thesis and the Pan-Turkists of Turkey.  
 
In accordance with this intellectual environment, in 1913, Turkish nationalism 
became the central ideology of the Ottoman state with the seizure of power by the 
Committee of Union and Progress (CUP). In fact, the loss of Balkan lands with the 
Balkan wars and rebellions among Muslims like that of Albanians had resulted with a 
certain disillusionment with the Ottomanist and Islamist ideals among the Unionists. 
This, of course, did not lead to a total abandonment of the Ottomanist and Islamist 
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elements. What was on the scene was the triumvirate these and Turkist elements. 
Actually, many members of the late Ottoman military and bureaucratic elite had been 
born in the Balkans. Therefore losing those lands did not only mean losing the 
productive tımar of the empire, but also losing roots and origins. These people were 
now ‘imprisoned’ in dry and barren Anatolia. For them, now, two choices were 
available as political strategies or as political outcomes of shrinking boundaries. They 
either had to accept what happened and so to create attachments to this piece of land or 
had to adopt an irredentist and aggressive stance concentrated on Turkish-speaking 
lands. At this stage, none of the strategies seem to be more solidified than the other.  
 
Thus, using the same references of Turkish nationalism, there gradually emerged 
two major groups. One was led by Enver and Talat Pashas, the other was led by the later 
Kemalists. In the First World War, the former hit the road to Sarıkamış by launching a 
military operation. However the catastrophic deaths of a large number of soldiers 
stopped them. This first defeat of the Pan-Turkist ideal was later followed by 
incorporation of the Turkish speaking lands to the Bolshevik Russia after the 
Revolution through the end of the First World War. The result was the possible 
functionality of the other part of the Unionists which had gradually converted to a more 
limited and defensible project that was, in fact, completed with the First World War. 
Their project constituted the basis of the Kemalist thinking. This, of course, did not 
mean that the Pan-Turkist ideal was totally left. It was only marginalized from the 
political center in the first years of the Republic. Very basically, the ultimate goals of 
the two varieties of Turkish nationalism were not similar; however they had the same 
sources so that they fed one another. Therefore the Pan-Turkist ideal was always 
somewhere as being nurtured by the Kemalist ideal and waiting to be awakened in a 
convenient time.  
 
In other words, the group following Enver and Talat was not formed by a 
handful of adventurists which deviated from the ‘normal path.’ They were the products 
of certain historical and political transformations as the Kemalists. What both groups 
did was to choose one out of two major ways and later to follow their ideal by pursuing 
very similar strategies since both attempted to create a Turkish nation out of the ruins of 
an empire.    
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2.2. ‘Turkish Nation-State:’ 
 
The National Pact of 1920 drew the framework of the Kemalist definition of 
‘Turkishness.’ This outline, based on Anatolia, determined the defenseline in the War of 
Independence. The Kemalist group was supported by many people living in Anatolia 
and Rumelia at that time, who actually had the motivation of protecting their lands from 
the ‘others.’ In fact, if one considers the later crises in the Kemalist regime, it is seen 
that the notion of a certain future project of building a Turkish nation was not really on 
the agenda of these people. On the other hand, the war had already awakened in them 
the feeling of a certain unity and cohesion, and this was further enhanced by the 
declaration of Republic. The single party regime, led by Mustafa Kemal was there to 
create the ‘Turkish nation’ within those legal boundaries through institutional, social 
and economic reforms as a part of the creation of a Turkish nation-state; so was neither 
an Ottoman state nor an Islamic state.  
 
Thus, it was not the ‘Turkish nation’ which established Turkish Republic; as it 
was not the one which fought in the War of Independence. Instead Anatolian-Rumelia 
people living in Turkey fought98 for the only space at their hands, as Zürcher states. The 
Pact of 1920 defined the borders for these people. From then on ‘Turkish nation-state’ 
was there with its boundaries, territory and people. Now the ultimate mission was to 
create a nation-a Turkish one within the boundaries, at the same level with 
‘contemporary civilizations’ differently than the provious multi-ethnic and multi-
religious political entity. The main strategy was to legitimize the war and the 
Republican claims of Anatolia while blocking the territorial demands of Greeks and 
Armenians. Here for decribing the strategy, what Anderson states for the Russian 
Empire can be applied; what the Kemalists did was to “stretch the short, tight skin of the 
nation over the vast body of nation-state [empire].”99  
 
The torturous project of creating Turkishness within the borders first came with 
an ideological motivation. The foremost aim was to become ‘westernized.’ Therefore 
the new regime, with its defined borders, had to prove itself in the international arena as 
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a nation-state which was different from the previous Islamic empire. The only way to 
realize this seemed to reject the Ottoman and Islamic heritage. Following the war, 
several international agreements were signed for keeping the borders safe. These 
agreements did not give any chance to any aggressive action. In this case, the newly 
established Turkish state had to be more careful in its relations with the ‘Outside Turks’ 
who were now under the sovereignty of the Soviet Union. 
 
As a consequence of this new construction of the Turkish nation-state and the re-
shaping of the world, the three systems of government, which had appeared as available 
choices to the Ottoman elite in the past, were declined. Besides these, Mustafa Kemal, 
in his various speeches, continuously emphasized that the new regime did not adopt any 
of Pan-Ottomanism, Pan-Islamism or Pan-Turkism.100 Turkish Hearths, which were 
intellectual platforms mostly for Russian-originated Turkists, adjusted their programmes 
to this vision. They changed ‘all Turks’ to ‘people of the Turkish Republic’ for 
implying their target group.101 Thus in 1924 Constitution, Turkish nation was defined 
on the basis of territorial citizenship as “people living in Turkey, regardless of their 
religion or race.”102 The second step was to identify minorities of Turkey. The Treaty of 
Lausanne served this purpose. Despite the inclusiveness in the definition of 
Turkishness, in Lausanne non-Muslims living within the borders were counted as non-
Turks.103 This nature of Treaty shows that the Kemalist elite were sometimes taking the 
advantage of previously created identities in order to form its nation. The interesting 
thing is that the new regime was trying to get rid off the Islamic heritage, while at the 
same time using Islam as the primary indicator of Turkishness within the existing 
borders. The reason for this might be the fact that there were not any other inclusive 
references of belonging except religion.  
 
Then in the mid 1920s a series of radical reforms were realized by the new state. 
In Gellner’s words; a high culture was begun to be imposed over the low culture. At 
first, the sultanate and the caliphate were abolished. A new law was passed to centralize 
education. The alphabet changed into Latin, new civil and penal codes were adopted 
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from the ‘West.’ These reforms made possible and were accompanied by an 
authoritarian single-party regime, in fact a single-man regime. Mustafa Kemal had 
already been holding all decision-making powers as the ‘Great Chief’ since the time of 
the War of Independence. These powers were increased in 1925 with the promulgation 
of the Law of Maintenance of Order104 which was passed after the Sheikh Said rebellion 
in the eastern part of Turkey. This rebellion is worth mentioning. It was neither purely 
religious nor purely ethnic;105 however it was so influential that the Turkish state 
considered it as a big challenge to the authority of the Turkish state. Mass deportation of 
the Kurds and mass recruitment from the Kurdish male population into the national 
army 106 were the two of important measures taken by the Kemalist elite.  
 
Following the rebellion, İsmet İnönü, the Second Man of the regime, made a 
speech at the center of Turkish Hearths in which he stated: “Only the Turkish nation is 
entitled to claim ethnic and national rights in its country. No other element has any such 
right. Our duty is in any case, to Turkify non-Turks within Turkish fatherland. We are 
going to eliminate any opposition to Turks and Turkishness.”107 The speech of İnönü 
demonstrates that ‘internal enemies’ was also one of the elements of Turkishness. The 
criterion was that if certain ethnic community challenged to the authority of the super-
identity at the top or not. If it is understood that it challenges, this community of people 
are entitled as ‘traitors.’ This is the actual way that the Kemalist regime drew the 
boundaries of the Turkishness. First, one should be a Muslim living in Turkey, should 
speak Turkish, and also should be absolutely loyal to the great ideal-ülkü, mefkure, one 
may call this as Kemalism’s Turan, which aimed to Turkify all people living in Turkey 
and protect the ‘State,’ differently than Pan-Turkism which had the goal of unifying all 
Turks. This speech was a signal for the 1930s, which witnessed step by step 
incorporation of all institutions and associations into the ‘State.’  
 
The centralizing measures required homogenization of minds willingly or 
unwillingly. In that context, some intellectuals overtly inspired by the Pan-Turkist idea 
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were integrated into the system. For instance, Halide Edip, whose novel Yeni Turan had 
become one of the inspiring books for the Pan-Turkists and who saw Azerbaijan’s 
independence as the first step towards Turan, subsequently abandoned Pan-Turkism. 
The Turanist poet Mehmed Emin Yurdakul changed the words ‘Turan’ to ‘vatan’ 
(fatherland) in his poems.108 This was followed by a limitation of the activities of 
Turkish Hearths in 1927. These constituted a challenge to the supremacy of the regime 
since they became the scene for Pan-Turkist discussions.109  
 
The step by step incorporation into the system reached to its peak in the 1930s. 
The RPP re-legitimized its position with a party programme. The closing down of Free 
Republican Party, which had turned out to be an anti-Kemalist forum, further 
strengthened the RPP by way of displaying that it was the only legitimate owner of the 
regime. The rising oppositions to the regime and reforms from different parts of the 
society were in fact the marks of the tension between active and passive or high and low 
cultures in Gellner’s terminology. Realizing the tension, the next step to be paved by the 
Kemalists was to block the opposition in front of the fulfillment of the nationalization 
mission through reforms. This could be done only by creating a super-ideology in that 
environment. Indeed it was the elite which established the ‘nation-state;’ however being 
a nation-state did not mean anything to average people living within the borders.  
 
The only mefkure-ideal of the people had been to ‘defend Anatolia.’ With the 
War of Independence, they had fulfilled that ideal by unifying under its umbrella. 
However after the regime was established there was not any reason for people to feel 
themselves attached to it. Shariah was still the dominating unifying facet among the 
people. The regime, since its very beginning had rejected the Ottoman and Islamic 
heritages; therefore there was nothing at the hands of intellectuals for creating the same 
unifying influence that especially Islam had. Although it was, by and large dismantled 
during the Ottoman times, Shariah still stood as a detailed manual for people. On the 
other hand, the Kemalists could not present this kind of a handbook Therefore 
formation of anti-Kemalist or anti-modernist platforms by average people or by the ones 
who were not included in the founder elite was not a surprise. Most of the opposing 
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voices were actually taking their ground from religion. This could only be discarded 
with an ideological basis as strong and influential as Shariah. By this way, strong and 
deep attachments among people to the nation, state and regime could be realized. Then 
the mission of nationalization could be fulfilled; because people would have reasons to 
feel themselves attached to the regime. 
 
To clarify, as Yıldız argues, the Kemalist elite had failed to supply the necessary 
romanticism to provide the continuation of what it had established.110 There were not 
any objective criteria except sharing the same territory that would keep these people 
together. Then ethnicity and race came to the scene as the defining criteria of the Turks 
and ‘others.’ Therefore it was not really a regime based on civic citizenship. It was 
territorial only because it had clearly defined borders; but this project did not have 
enough ‘ideological supply’ to fill this territories. Besides, since the Ottoman and 
Islamic heritages were rejected, the new regime could not justify Turks’ existence in 
Anatolia. Despite the rejection, referring to Islam, Muslims were somehow 
incorporated; they were not even counted as ‘nations.’ However there were also Greeks 
and Armenians living there. In fact, the mass deportation of the Armenians in 1915 for 
homogenizing Anatolian population had already resulted with the death of many 
Armenians. The new nation-state had to deal with this issue somehow. There was also 
the Greek factor. They were considered as ‘the traitors’ by the Turkish nation state. 
However they were praised in the ‘West’ since they fulfilled the image of romantic, 
independent and democratic ‘Greek miracle’ that Renan had constructed in 1876. Thus, 
Turkish existence should also be justified in such a way to disclaim any other nation’s 
existence, to correct its image of barbarians in the ‘West,’ and also to prove that it was 
as ancient, democratic, and independent as Greece or other European nations were.111 
 
Thus with these considerations mainly depended on the psychology of 
‘defending’ and ‘proving,’ the emphasis was put on ethnicity flavored with religion. 
Every Muslim living in Turkey was called Turk or some ‘mountain-Turks’ who had 
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forgotten their Turkishness as the Kurds.112 On the other hand, there were non-Muslims, 
these should be assimilated somehow. This is the ‘dark side’ of Kemalist nationalism 
within the borders of the Turkish state as Parla mentions,113 which was made visible 
through various policies and laws.114 At that point, science and history were used for 
legitimizing the nation’s existence against the non-Turks and also to create attachments 
among the Turks. Racial proofs were searched for filling ‘Turkishness’ independently 
from Islamic or Ottoman elements. These proofs while displaying who was the real 
Turk and who was not, at they had to be in such a way that the barbaric image of the 
Turks’ would be eliminated. This would scientifically prove that the Turks were as 
developed and talented as the ‘West.’ It was this point that racist elements, which were 
already there as the ideological production of late Ottoman Empire Pan-Turkist and 
European orientalist heritage. In fact, the Kemalist elite had bypassed the Ottoman and 
Islamic heritages at the official level and now they had that available package: European 
racism, orientalism, and Pan-Turkist works in this era of rising dictatorships. 
 
 
2.3. The Outline for Turkishness: Turkish History Thesis: 
 
Despite the rejection, the new Turkish Republic inherited the tenets of its 
intellectual structure from the Ottoman Empire. This inheritance also included the 
influence of European modernity. This package of two hundred years drew the mental 
map of the Kemalist elite.  With that accumulation of knowledge and above-mentioned 
considerations, they decided to rediscover the identity of the Turkish Republic, 
Turkishness, through a rewriting of its history by referring to such disciplines as 
archeology, philology and anthropology. As in other nationalisms, the original 
homeland and the defining characteristics of the Turks were going to be uncovered and 
the autochthon identity was going to be shown with proofs, documents and records. 
This would erase any ambiguity or contradiction in the identity; so that eliminate the 
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critics with the power of science at back. Most importantly the sleeping beauty would 
be awakened by the help of a golden age reference which was going to supply the 
necessary romanticism and mefkure through a depiction of the glorious past, silence 
present, and the mission of re-glorifying the nation in future. This agenda would help to 
create a homogeneous population with homogeneous aims within the borders of Turkey, 
so any opposition to the regime could be blocked. 
 
 Thus the rediscovery and creation of Turkishness began under the control of the 
Turkish State. This implies that this was a political project, not a scientific one. At first 
a history commission was established as a branch of Turkish Hearths in 1930. Its 
members included leading nationalists-politicians of the day, such as Afet İnan (1908-
1985); Mehmed Tevfik [Bıyıkoğlu], the General Secretary of Mustafa Kemal and 
President of the Commission, Samih Rıfat (Deputy to Çanakkale); Akçura (Deputy to 
İstanbul and Professor of law); Reşit Galip (Deputy and the General Secretary of the 
Commission); Hasan Cemil [Çambel] (1879-1967), (Deputy to Bolu); Sadri Maksudi 
[Arsal] (1880-1957), Deputy; Şemseddin [Günaltay] (1883-1961) (Deputy to Sivas); 
Yusuf Ziya [Özer] (1870-1947), Professor of law at İstanbul University.115 Under the 
direction of Mustafa Kemal and at the request of the Ministry of Education, the 
commission wrote a new textbook titled Türk Tarihinin Ana Hatları (The Main Tenets 
of Turkish History) in 1930. However it was found unsatisfactory by Mustafa Kemal; 
just its summary was published one hundred copies and distributed.116  
 
The book summarized the basics of the Turkish History Thesis. In its 
introduction the aim was stated as “to reveal the secret of intelligence and 
characteristics of the Turk, to show this special character and strength of the Turk to 
himself and to declare the deep racial roots of our national evolution.”117 Besides, it s 
declared that the book comes up with an alternative to the genesis theories of different 
religions.118 This indicates that the book also had the aim of presenting an alternative 
history which was ‘universalistic’ and ‘scientific;’ hence an alternative not only to Islam 
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but also other monotheistic religions. The main problem of the book is that nation-
builders were using the methodology of making presumption and then providing the 
evidence to verify. Then, they were claiming it to be scientific.    
 
This was a monopoly of the state and it was further enhanced in 1931 when the 
Turkish Hearths were closed. Under the control of RPP, People’s Houses were opened. 
These would serve for spreading ‘Turkish national culture’ and ‘westernizing 
reforms.’119  A new organization, Türk Tarih Tetkik Cemiyeti (The Society for the Study 
of Turkish History), which later took the name of Türk Tarih Kurumu (Turkish 
Historical Society) was formed. It was followed by Türk Dil Kurumu (Turkish 
Linguistic Society). These two societies were given the duty of filling inside of 
‘Turkishness’ through making research to find ‘racial proofs.’120 Turkish Historical 
Society then published a four-volume history textbook for high schools for the 
academic year 1931-1932. The book was written as the result of collective work of 
above-mentioned authors and through a continuous consultation with Mustafa Kemal. 
In the book, the Ottoman Empire did not occupy much place unlike ‘the ancient Turks,’ 
‘their fatherland’ and ‘their migrations.’121 
 
Following the publication of the book, the first history congress was gathered in 
Ankara in 1932. The primary aim of the congress was to introduce Turkish History 
Thesis and so, ‘Turkishness’ to the public.122 The participants were predominantly high 
school teachers who were the potential users of the textbook. In the papers delivered at 
the congress, race was emphasized as the determining factor of any civilization. It was 
argued that national history should be written by referring to the racial origins. On this 
way to rewrite, ‘correcting’ the image of the ‘barbarian’ Turks was the first goal. This 
would be done by explaining that the Turks were the establisher of earliest civilizations 
in the world. Eugene Pittard, one of the race-ideologues that Mustafa Kemal read, was 
shown as the major reference. He argued that race is connected to blood, and it does not 
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change as time passes. Pittard’s emphasis on ethnic continuity became the guiding 
principle of the Society.  
 
Here it is worth mentioning that Gobineau was the other author that Mustafa 
Kemal read. However he was not as influential as Pittard among the nation-builders, 
because Gobineau argued exactly the opposite of Pittard. According to him, races lose 
their homogeneity in time. Therefore the superior class-white became contaminated by 
the inferior yellow one. In that hierarchical picture, Gobineau placed Turks among the 
Mongoloid yellow race and argued that their purity and homogeneity also had been 
contaminated with the Ottomans and Seljuks.123  If Gobineau was chosen as the main 
reference by the nation-builders, the assumed continuity between the Turks of 1930 and 
the ancient ones could not be explained. In order to reject the Islamic and Ottoman 
heritage, on the other hand, Gobineau’s theory was needed but in an incomplete way 
which remarked that Turks were not contaminated by Islam; but their real essence and 
identity were shadowed by it as a consequence of hundreds of years of alienation. It 
seems that a total discrediting of Islam was not that possible unlike the nationalists had 
assumed. 
 
 In the same direction, “the designated historian of Atatürk,” Afetinan presented 
a paper in which she argued that Turks did not belong to the Mongoloid yellow race, 
because they had already been in the highest stage of civilization at a time when Europe 
was living in ignorance and savageness.124 This was the basis of her Ph.D. thesis, Türk 
Halkının Antropolojik Karakterleri ve Türkiye Tarihi (On the Anthropological 
Character of the Turkish People and Turkish History), which she wrote under the 
supervision of Pittard. This thesis was produced as the result of an anthropometrical 
research on the skulls of sixty five thousands Turks the main argument being that the 
Turks were a brachycephal (broad-headed) race, a characteristic that defines Alpine 
group of the white race.125 Contributing to İnan, Reşit Galip, in his article, depicted the 
physical characteristics of the Turkish race; “tall, white skinned, mostly blue-eyed, as 
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being one of the most beautiful representatives of the white race.”126 Another 
nationalist, Hasan Cemil [Çambel] referred to the anthropometric and linguistic data by 
Hommel, a German anthropologist and argued that the creators of the Crete civilization 
were the ancient Turks.127  
 
Until the following history congress, making ‘scientific research’ depending on 
race became very popular. For instance, in 1935 Sinan’s skeleton was examined by the 
members of Turkish History Society in order to reach his perfect intelligence and 
scientific personality.128 Within this environment of popularization of science for 
determining the racial characteristics, the second history congress was gathered. In the 
congress Pittard also presented a paper. In it he argued that Turks are the members of 
brachycephal Homo-Alpinus race, which migrated to Europe from Central Asia by 
passing through the Straits and Danube. They are the ones who taught European people 
to domesticate animals and cultivate.129 Another interesting paper was by Nurettin 
Onur. He argued that, more importantly than anthropometric research, blood group is 
the determinant of race. According to his data, the A group was specific to Europe and 
Asia, and the B group was seen in India and China. In Turkey, the percentage of type A 
increases from the east to the west. Onur takes this as evidence for that Turks were the 
main root of that A group and transmitter of it to Europe.130  
 
Şevket Aziz Kansu presented a remarkable paper as well. Examining the 
skeletons of Seljuk Turks, he argued that there was ethnic continuity in Anatolia.131 
Moreover, Sadi Irmak, in his research, emphasized the importance of blood types and 
finger print in distinguishing different races from one another. According to his 
research, Turks’ blood groups and fingerprints are very similar to those of people living 
in Southern Europe. By Irmak, this similarity was taken as an evidence of that these 
people had common ancestors. The argument then reaches to its direction with the 
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Irmak’s claim that Turks were not contaminated like most of the Europeans, particularly 
Germans, and Greeks.132 Here by referring to the Germans, Irmak actually made a 
remark about the rise of racist ideals in Germany. In that context, what Irmak argues for 
is that Turkish nation is a more homogeneous nation that that of the Germans’. Not 
surprisingly, the other degenerated and contaminated nation is the Greeks which had 
claims in Anatolia. Irmak left no space for any Greek interest in Anatolia, and in any 
civilization with that argument as the other Kemalist theses.  
 
Besides ethnic continuity, the ‘civilized genius’ of the Turks was declared 
through emphasizing their state-making ability. Sadri Makdusi Arsal argued that 
nomads had the ability of unifying many tribes in case of a war. This made them 
talented in establishing states. In the Turkish case also nomads played a role in terms of 
defense; but the real founders were sedentary Turks.133 Here Arsal engages in a big 
attempt of ‘correcting’ the image. On the one hand, he accepts that Turks were nomads; 
on the other he argues that the ones who established many states were not sedentary 
having the nomadic nature of the Mongols in his mind. In the correction of image, 
Kemal Kepelioğlu stresses the importance of sports for the Turks. According to his 
presentation, many types of sports that were thought as the innovations of Europe were 
actually belonged to the Turks who even had a branch called Sports.134 Again 
Kepelioğlu paves the way of claiming the ownership of European civilization with no 
emphasis on the Ottomans; but along with a presentation of heroic deeds and life-time 
fitting nature of the Turks.    
 
The rejection of Islamic heritage was also on the scene. Arsal states that the 
intellectuals were waiting for Mustafa Kemal as the savior, chief like the Arab 
intellectuals who waited for Muhammad.135 This sentence monopolizes the leadership in 
Mustafa Kemal while also taking the benefit of a widely-known historical incident. By 
this way, a similarity in terms of impacts is established while at the same time reducing 
the striking importance of Mohammed in the eyes of people. In fact, the rejection of 
Islamic heritage was also on the scene. First Psalty, an Athenian participant, made a 
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presentation on the Christian Turks, the Gagaus.136 The main argument was that Turk 
did not mean Muslim every time. Another presentation was by Şerafettin Yaltkaya. He 
stated that Islam had some similar customs to the Turkish ones. As one of the examples 
he declared the tradition of rain-stone; meaning to rub one stone against the other with 
the belief of making it rain, in ancient Turks, and rain-prayer in Islam. According to 
Yaltkaya, this shows that Islam borrowed from the ancient Turks.137 While being aware 
of Islam’s prominence among the people, one presentation emphasizes Christians, and 
the other Turkicizes Islam. Both contribute greatly to reducing the importance of Islam. 
 
In the second history congress, the Sun-Language Theory was also publicized 
with Hasan Reşit Tankut and İbrahim Necmi Dilmen’s presentations. According to this 
theory, Turkish is the earliest language in the world. Other great languages like Arabic, 
Persian and French, were originated from it.138 The theory then goes on by displaying 
some of the similarities between other languages and their Turkish counterparts. 
Özdoğan here makes a very interesting point. The Sun-Language Theory had already 
been presented by Enver Celalettin Pasha in 1917, but it did not become that popular.139 
This may be related with the fact that at the beginning of the twentieth century the 
intellectual elite was not that ready for this kind of an inclusive idea. Their language 
‘reforms’ were just including literature, education and press.140 On the other hand, 
Celalettin’s ideas presented Turkish as being independent from the Ottoman Turkish. 
This could be a radical idea for the day’s intellectuals. However the Kemalist elite had 
the claim that the Turks were the earliest civilization in the world. This naturally led to 
the idea that all languages originated from Turkish. Legitimizing the attempts of 
‘cleaning’ the language from Arabic and Persian elements, this new theory also 
‘proved’ that Turkish was the origin of European languages. This perception meant that 
Turks were a part of the western civilization since the very beginning; they were even 
the creators of it. This eliminated the existence of other languages. The rejection of 
linguistic heritage through inventing a pre-Islamic tradition also justified the reforms 
like transition to Latin alphabet and translation of the call to prayer into Turkish.  
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To elaborate more on the theses, firstly, the nation-builders were fighting against 
the image of the Turks as barbaric and not enough talented for establishing civilization. 
It was argued in the theses that Turks were the members of the superior Arian race. 
Then it was declared that they were an ‘ancient civilized nation,’ which was already 
democratic and egalitarian since the 7th century BC. Besides, it was the Turks who 
civilized Central Asia and established the earliest civilizations in China, India, 
Mesopotamia, Nile Valley, Anatolia and the Aegean coast by disseminating their talents 
and values.141 Then the Thesis challenges to the ancient Greece mythos of the European 
civilization which has been used by the Europeans to claim that they were already 
established the highest civilization which was at the same time the basis for the 
contemporary democracy. The Thesis claims that in the formation of ancient Greece, 
Turks played a great role; therefore ancient Greek was actually originated from the 
ancient Central Asian Turkish language with small differences in the dialects. Indeed, 
claiming a share in the Greek civilization was such a big project among the late 
Ottoman early Republican intellectuals. Particularly Yakup Kadri and Yahya Kemal 
were interested in taking the roots back to the ancient Greece, under the title Neo-
Hellenism movement, through their writings. They argued that Bahr-i Sefid Havza-i 
Medeniyeti in Anatolia nurtured the ancient Greek civilization.142 As a production of 
this understanding, Yakup Kadri in his novel, Nur Baba depicts the rituals of a Bektashi 
tekke for showing the similarities with Dionysus rituals.143 
 
As the second point, the theses implied that the original homeland of the Turks 
was Central Asia. Turks migrated from there as a result of climatic changes, mainly 
drought. With the migration they scattered everywhere to establish civilizations.144 This 
point of the Thesis was giving the Turks their pre-Islamic roots while at the same time 
explaining the reason for their existence in Anatolia. Climatic changes, ‘the reason for 
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the migration’ was providing an ‘objective’ and ‘scientific reason’ that could not be 
challenged by social or political ones.  
 
The third point of the theses was that from the immemorial time Turks 
established eighteen states including; ancient Egyptian civilization and state, the Hittites 
in Anatolia, Sumerians in Mesopotamia, the Great Hun Empire in Asia, the Seljuks, 
Timur’s empire, the Mongol Empire in India, the Turkish-Ottoman Empire and finally 
the Turkish Republic. The best one among those was considered to be the last one. 
State-making here is attributed only to the Turks, so it provided a powerful stance for 
the modern Turkish state against minorities. This state-making talent was also an 
explanation for why Turks did not go through a barbaric phase.145  
 
The last point was that, from the very beginning Turks were there as ‘a nation’ 
with their military and state. This point at the same time reduces the importance of the 
Ottoman Empire in the ‘national’ history of the Turks.146 This marginalization of the 
Ottomans did not mean discrediting of it completely. It was still needed for justifying 
the present period of somnolence or the period of darkness when all glory was lost. It 
was argued that the Ottomans, because of their bad administration, shadowed the real 
essence of the Turks, such as Turks ability to establish egalitarian, democratic and 
ethnically pure states. This claim also helped to another one; the ethnic continuity of 
contemporary Turks with the ancient ones. According to the theses, since the Bronze 
Age and the Hittites, Turks did not live through a racial or political interruption; 
therefore they kept their continuity. This claim was at the same time, historically 
Turkifying Anatolia.147   
  
With all these elements and ‘proofs,’ the Ottoman-Turkish history was re-
written. The result was a complex road map shaped by the mixture of different legacies. 
Gökalp and Akçura were the two most influential ideologues of the building process. A 
combination of their views, as culture and race, was at the hands of the elite. In his 
Türkçülüğün Esasları, Gökalp emphasizes common culture, morality, aesthetics and 
religion as the elements that make people a ‘nation.’ He does not count race or blood 
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tie. For him people living in a country might belong to different races, after some time, 
if they do not mix up with people from other countries, they turn into a single nation. 
People of other cultures but having the same aim of becoming a nation, might learn the 
nation’s culture through education.148 Similarly to Gökalp, the Kemalist elite 
emphasized culture as one of the unifying factors for a nation. In that case, both Gökalp 
and the Kemalist elite declared that westernization or muasırlaşmak should include 
borrowing of technical matters; not anything cultural. However the Kemalist elite added 
ethnic heritage into the picture. According to them, ‘national culture’ is hereditary, 
cannot be learnt through education if a person was not carrying the real essence of it.  
 
The Kemalist elite borrowed the ‘hereditary’ aspect of ‘nation’ probably from 
Akçura, who stresses common ethnic heritage. For the Turkish case, Akçura argues that 
despite conversions to different religions throughout history, Turks protected their 
common cultural and ethnic heritage. Among the elements of this culture, Akçura states 
patrimonial political system, the talent of administration and establishing powerful 
states. His is a more secularized approach in comparison to Gökalp’s. For Akçura, 
religion has a functional role of unifying people; it makes things easy for founding the 
Pan-Turkist unity. Except the point on irredentism, at the official level, Kemalist elite 
seemed to take Akçura as the guide in creating history. Since Akçura did not base his 
argument on religion, he was able to present a secular approach for the elite. This can be 
the reason why Gökalp’s Türkçülüğün Esasları was not published for a second time 
until 1939.149 Most importantly, Akçura’s emphasis on continuity became the main 
tenet of the Turkish History Thesis in order to ‘prove’ that Anatolia belonged to Turks, 
the clearly and distinctly identifiable ethnic community throughout history. Thus 
Akçura’s approach helped to write a ‘racialized history,’ in fact he was one of the 
authors of History textbook by the Turkish History Society.  
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CHAPTER III: 
 
 
SUPREMACY OF ‘STATE’ AND REACTIONS TO ANONYMITY 
     
 
3.1. The Kemalist Regime and ‘Outside Influences:’ 
“Almanya’da nasıl Hitler varsa, 
 bizim de Atatürk’ümüz var.” 
                                                                                         İbrahim Tatlıses, Milliyet, 04.04.2005 
 
The dissemination of the Turkish History Thesis, centered on an anonymous 
race-based definition of Turkishness, was not as smooth as the thesis’ creation. The 
identity was created by the ‘State,’ therefore any opposition to it carried the same 
meaning with opposing to the ‘State.’ This Weberian understanding of ‘State’ shaped 
the nature of the regime. In order to block the oppositions to the collective 
homogeneous identity, centralization of the State through various mechanisms and 
measurements was required. The measures were implemented through a single-party 
regime. Although there took place two experiences for transition to multi-party regime 
system, they were short-lived. The most important reason for their failure was that they 
actually formed an anti-regime, so ‘anti-modern’ platform as Kemalists thought. They 
were considered as challenges to the ‘State,’ and so the two political parties were closed 
down.  
 
The main aim of the Kemalist elite was to provide supremacy of the ‘State’ 
similarly to late Ottoman intellectuals who tried to cure the ‘ill man.’ The Kemalist elite 
were trying to defend the ‘State,’ eliminate challenges in any way, for ‘reaching 
contemporary level of civilizations.’ This approach to State further empowered the 
equation of nation to state, which came to mean that nation could not exist without 
‘State.’ In this case the leader was the embodiment of ‘nation-State.’ Mustafa Kemal 
was the only charismatic leader of the movement, who had all powers at his hand. He 
was the Grand Chief, later the ‘Father’ like Duce or Führer, he was the personification 
of the system whose authority was legitimized through various laws. This is the reason 
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why in the Speech; Mustafa Kemal tells the ‘War of Independence’ or the reforms by 
using ‘I,’ as if he tells his own personal story.150 After the death of Mustafa Kemal, 
İsmet İnönü immediately declared himself the ‘National Chief’ and at the same time the 
Constitution was revised to make İnönü the permanent general president of the RPP.151 
However, the foremost reason for this centralization was not to challenge Mustafa 
Kemal’s leadership, but to protect permanency, supremacy and integrity of the ‘State’ in 
that environment of power vacuum after his death.152 Then, İnönü adopted a tight 
control over the decision-making process.153  
 
Despite this centralization of decision-making, Turhan Feyzioğlu in his article, 
Atatürk ve Milliyetçilik, states that Kemalism, ‘the ideology of Turkey,’ cannot be 
equalized with any kind of dictatorial or theocratic system like fascism, communism, 
and racism. It is rational, modern, civilized, humanist, democratic, peaceful, and 
unifying.154 However historically it is not a good starting point to think Kemalism as 
independent and isolated from other contemporary political systems of the time. It was 
not located in a vacuum, so that it developed in the same pool with other nation and 
state-building ideologies of Europe; such as the dictatorships in Germany and Italy. To 
look from a broader aspect, following the First World War, democracy was a trend in 
the world; Europe and also Turkish Republic went into democratization by adopting 
territorial understanding of citizenship. However during the period between 1918 and 
1945, that ‘temple,’ in Mazower’s allegory, was left as a consequence of a series 
political and economic crisis, including the world economic crisis of 1929 and the crisis 
in the universalistic territorial citizenship which was challenged by ‘local.’155 The race-
fetish of the nationalists became visible in the 1930s in Europe leading to 
chauvinism.156  In that case, as Koçak states there were other national chiefs in the 
international arena as Mustafa Kemal. 157 
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Thus this period witnessed the rise of dictatorial regimes, and already existing 
racist nature, under powerful leaders. Within this picture, ‘Grand Chief’ and ‘National 
Chief’ of the Kemalist regime were very similar to nation-leader equation of the 
corporatist and fascist regimes. In fact some of the Kemalist elite imply that they 
admired from these dictatorships. The General Secretary of the RPP, Recep Peker, in 
his class notes of History of Revolution that he gave between 1934 and 1935, mentions 
them in a positive manner158 particularly by emphasizing the authoritarian, statist and 
corporatist sides of them.159 Besides, in his memoirs, Niyazi Berkes, Professor of 
sociology at İstanbul University in the mid-1930s, makes the point of the Kemalist 
elite’s borrowings from the authoritarian regimes. He states that being against Mustafa 
Kemal carried the same meaning with being anti-nationalist very similar to national 
socialism in which being anti-Nazi meant being not a real nationalist.160  This remark of 
Berkes is more understandable if the remaining part of above-mentioned speech of 
İnönü after the Sheikh Said Rebellion is considered; “We are openly nationalists…and 
nationalism is our sole unifying element.”161 These sentences imply that nationalism 
only meant Turkish nationalism since ‘Turkishness’ is assumed to be the only anti-
Ottoman, anti-Islamic and also ‘modern’ unifying element. 
 
In the mid-1930s, one Party, one State, one Leader, and one nation equation was 
empowered. Here nation is not written with capital n, because it was the passive 
element, object of this equation. Turkish citizens were considered to be natural 
members of the RPP. Therefore getting rid of any opposition was a mission for all.162 
The RPP increased its measures for centralization as new challenges within the borders 
emerged. Then many associations were closed down together with various 
newspapers.163 Berkes declares the political environment of the day as follows; “closing 
down of the newspapers became a part of our daily lives.”164 Furthermore, in its fourth 
congress, the RPP also prepared a political programme. The influence of fascism and 
national socialism can also be followed from that programme. In the fiftieth article it 
was stated that “Turkish youth is going to be gathered under a national organization 
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which will inculcate them love of homeland and revolution together with a pure 
morality.” Accordingly, “physical education will be given to all Turkish youth in order 
to equip them with the necessary physical and mental skills for defending the country 
by dedicating themselves with their whole existence.”165 This article absolutes State’s 
control over ‘its’ people.  
 
After RPP’s first programme in 1935, Law of Physical Education was 
promulgated. These policies concerning sports and physical education were shaped 
under German influence. Turkish government itself invited doctors and athletes to 
Turkey in order to strengthen Turkish population.166 The control of body by the State 
was also prevalent in population policies. As in the case of national socialism, the main 
idea was to prevent population from degeneration, so that to create a mentally and 
physically fit population167 in this world of struggles and war.168 This qualified 
population was seen as the potential army in fact whole ‘nation’ was an army, since the 
Turks were a military-nation.169 Therefore only Turks were given permission to study at 
Military schools.170 The campaign for speaking Turkish and also the Wealth Tax 
eliminated non-Muslims who had a big share in trade.171  
  
Thus, in the larger context, Kemalist regime developed in the same pool with 
other contemporary ideologies of the time. Its absolutist and totalitarian understanding 
of state was accompanied by racism in creating a homogeneous nation. These were 
mainly the heritages of the nineteenth century positivism, German Romanticism, and 
also the Ottoman Empire. For the Turkish case, together with the future prospect of 
westernization, Turkism of the previous century constituted the major vein that those 
different layers of influence were mixed and poured down. In fact as in the case of the 
age of nationalisms, neither the Ottoman Empire nor Turkey can be taken as isolated 
from what was happening in the world at that time. In the middle of these different 
influences Turkish nationalism was established on racial presumptions as many other 
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nationalisms of the time. Through science these presumptions or myths were ‘proven’ 
and so turned into absolute, unchallengeable ‘realities.’  Any critique was perceived as a 
challenge to the permanency of the ‘State.’ However there were critiques to that 
homogeneous identity which laid down westernization as the sole aim and explained the 
Turks contributions to the civilization by referring to ‘western’ civilization. The critics 
were kept away from the state circles, because they were challenging the absolute 
monopoly of the state on intellectual production. 
 
3.2. Reactions to Anonymity:  
Thus the nation-builders acted as historians or vice versa. No matter who they 
were, their mission was to prove the original thesis through history and anthropology. 
Writing state-sponsored history provided the legitimacy for an understanding of history 
that was limited to political powers.172 Especially with the closing down of the Turkish 
Hearths, intellectual production was monopolized by the ‘State,’ there was no space for 
interpretation. In the first congress few scholars could able to criticize that religion. 
Their critiques were mainly about the methodology, because the sources used by these 
nation-builders were secondary sources imported from European anthropologists and 
philologists. In other words, like Ottomans did, ‘Turks’ were also learning themselves 
through European gaze nurtured by the considerations of ‘proving.’  
 
Fuat Köprülü, as one of the critics, attracted attention to the use of sources and 
declared that the European sources on Turkish history were so new to present efficient 
arguments; Chinese sources should be used for discovering the ancient Turks. Zeki 
Velidi Togan also argued that the findings were not seemed to be scientific. He 
articulated that big climatic changes happened much earlier than Turks’ migration from 
Central Asia. Therefore drought could not be the reason. In order to find out the reasons 
Chinese archive should be examined especially for understanding the rivals between 
Turks and other people living in Central Asia.173 In the minds Togan’s suggestion on 
looking at the relations with other people, could lead to the feeling that ‘Turks escaped 
from their homeland.’ This was unacceptable, because Turks were brave fighters since 
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an immemorial time. Taking an old climatic change and pasting it to the time that Turks 
were supposed to migrate was the solution, because it seemed to be more ‘scientific’ 
with its focus on only Turks, not also other communities. Therefore, the questions of 
these two scholars raised a big negative reaction to themselves. The interesting thing is 
that the only target was not Togan’s ideas. After some point the debate turned into a 
personal one.174 Then without answering any of the questions, the congress was closed 
by Yusuf Akçura.  
 
The reactions to the critiques had become too influential that there was not even 
small critique to the thesis in the second congress, which Ersanlı calls as the ‘victory of 
scienticism.’175 Another remarkable point by Ersanlı is that the critiques and responses 
to them also show who was closer to the center.176 As a Pan-Turkist, but more of a 
functional and analytical one, Akçura incorporated into the Kemalist elite; he was one 
of the architects of the Thesis which was pursuing Turkism in Turkey. Togan was also a 
Pan-Turkist like Akçura. In fact, according to Copeaux, the Thesis was completely 
based on Togan’s book Umumi Türk Tarihine Giriş (Introduction to General Turkish 
History), in which Togan argued that Turks had relations with Chinese, Indian, 
Mesopotamian, Asian, Egyptian, and even Central American civilizations. The only 
difference was with the Thesis was the degree of emphasis on the role of Turks.177 
Furthermore, Togan did not support all of the Kemalist reforms, such as the transition to 
Latin alphabet. According to him, since it could not be read by other Turkish-speaking 
communities unlike the Arabic one, Latin alphabet would prevent the intellectual 
connection between Turkey and other Turkish speaking lands. For a ‘westernizing,’ the 
permanency of Arabic alphabet was unacceptable. Besides, Togan argued that an 
independent academic linguistics commission of all Turkish-speaking lands should be 
established for making an evolution in Turkish language, not a revolution.178 He was 
suggesting alternative things to the Kemalist elite. However this was not acceptable by 
the intellectual monopoly that was striving to eliminate every reference to Islam.   
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Togan was a politically active Pan-Turkist in the Turkish-speaking lands 
whereas the Kemalist elite were trying to keep itself away from Pan-Turkist discussions 
at the official level. However the nation-builders of Turkey still needed Pan-Turkist 
ideas in order to bypass Islamic and Ottoman roots. Emphasizing that they were not 
Pan-Turkists, the elite at the same time pushed for ‘cultural Turkism’ through a 
‘racialized history.’ The Thesis defined Turkishness in such a way to instill pride to 
people as being ‘the descendants’ of a glorious race. This was the agenda-mission-
mefkure; to reawaken that ‘essence’ in deep inside of every ‘Turk.’ This could be 
realized only by pumping ‘cultural Turkism.’  
 
Accordingly, the Turkish History Thesis has become a part of educational 
curriculum. Besides, the People’s Houses published a series of books for spreading the 
Central Asian thesis to the older generation. One of the books was Fuat Şükrü Dilbilen’s 
Turan ve Türkler. This included poetry which idealized Turan and longed for the 
land.179 Here the longing for the land geographically was not necessarily a Pan-Turkist 
image, but might be a milder version of it used deliberately. Another book was A. Avni 
Çandar’s Türklüğün Kökleri ve Yayılışı. In its first chapter, the greatness of the Turks is 
emphasized.180 Besides, the Sun-Language Theory was publicized through books on the 
issue.181 In addition to these, a mass use of Central Asia paganist figures was on the 
scene as a part of daily life. The Grey Wolf figure was reproduced every where; on 
money, cigarette packages, on the hats of school children, as the emblem of the Ministry 
of Education, Turcology Institute, National Turkish Students Association, Turkish 
Hearths, first ‘national’ oil company-Petrol Ofisi, Turkish scouts.182 It is not wrong to 
say that in every aspect of the life the Turkish History Thesis, ‘the glorious origins 
coming from the Central Asia’ was reproduced. The process was like Gellner’s. 
Through the use of education and communications, the high culture, the super-identity 
disseminated itself to everywhere without considering any alternative.  
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Thus, with the closing of the Turkish Hearths and marginalization of the 
alternative ideas, history-writing was monopolized. This led to strong pronouncements 
of who are ‘we’ and ‘they.’ Combined with the efforts to create an agenda for the future 
generations, ‘Turkishness’ was defined anonymously. This definition was ‘verified’ 
through science, and myths were turned into ‘proven’ realities; so that the critiques were 
blocked at the official level whereas Pan-Turkists ideas were still referred in order to 
establish the Thesis within the society. This certainly implies an ideological continuity 
in Turkish nationalism. However the problem was not the use of Pan-Turkist ideas as 
long as they stayed at the cultural level. In fact, they had to be kept at that level also 
because of the Soviet Union factor. The problem was basically a struggle for getting 
power to be at the center; it was a struggle to become a part of history.  
 
The ‘reactionaries’ came together under another discussion platform for Turkist 
ideas, which, in a way, replaced the Turkish Hearths.183 This new platform was journals. 
They also constituted a platform for anti-‘modern’ values of the center, so also anti-
center, accordingly anti-regime as Kemalists considered them despite the fact that they 
were coming from the same vein except the Kemalist strong emphasis on 
westernization. From then on, these journals became the prominent part of history of 
Pan-Turkism184  and history of Turkish nationalism after the Thesis. For choosing the 
medium of journal as a platform instead of others, Türkkan in his article states that 
publication of a journal did not require a large capital investment. Indeed the Turkish 
Press, particularly the newspapers, was being controlled very rigidly. In that case, 
journal was a good choice, because if it was suspended by the State for any reason, a 
new one could be published immediately.185  
 
The first journal was Atsız Mecmua, which was published one month after the 
suspension of the Turkish Hearths, May 15 1931. It appeared as seventeen issues until 
25 September 1932. Its publisher-editor was Nihal Atsız, a student of Togan. The 
contributors included Zeki Velidi Togan, Abdulkadir İnan, Nihad Sami Banarli, Orhan 
Şaik Gökyay, Sabahattin Ali, Abdulbaki Gölpınarlı, Pertev Naili Boratav, Ali İhsan 
Sabis, Ahmet Caferoglu, Şakir Ülkütaşır, and Fuat Köprülü. If the 1944 feud between 
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Nihal Atsız and Sabahattin Ali is considered, it can be said that the journal was an 
umbrella for ‘marginalized’ intellectuals of different sides. In other words, Atsız 
Mecmua brought together different intellectuals who were anti-center, not necessarily 
Pan-Turkists always. However there is also the point that Atsız himself was writing a 
large percentage of the articles. The writings mostly focus on cultural aspects; Turkish 
history and literature, with considerable attention given to the Turkish-speaking people. 
There are articles on Uzbek and Turkmen music,186 and popular literature of 
Azerbaijan.187 A series of articles concerned with the statistical data of Turks living in 
Soviet lands.188 In the end it is stated that there are 16.462.381 Turks living in Soviet 
lands. The loyalty to Mustafa Kemal is also emphasized despite the fact that Atsız was a 
Pan-Turkist; “Turkish history met with its genius and accepted him deeply as the eternal 
masterpiece.”189 
 
The most important article of Atsız for showing his reaction to the Turkish 
History Thesis is “Which race Turks are belonged to?” In the article, Atsız opposes to 
the argument that Turks were belonged to the same race with the Europeans. He 
declares “are we going to be the member of same race with the gypsies while trying to 
escape from the wild Mongols?” He then continues that “there is no need to claim the 
ownership of the civilizations of foreign tribes” “for arguing that Turks are the first 
comers to Anatolia,” “this is not scientific.” At that point, his militaristic ideas come to 
the scene. According to him there is no need to be the oldest tribe in a particular land to 
claim its ownership. The most important thing is to provide the superiority of the 
Turkish race in that land. The foremost aim, mefkure for Atsız is the unification of all 
Turks, so that the formation of Great Turkey under one flag and one army.190 Therefore 
Atsız gives some militant messages to the Turkish youth.191 Although the geographical 
reference of Atsız is not limited with Anatolia, he argues that the real essence of 
Turkishness is found in the Anatolian villagers. Atsız does not look for a pure blood tie 
among the conditions of being Turk. For him ‘consciousness is enough, but it is 
hereditary. Therefore he considers the ones who carry Turkish blood as Turk. Atsız does 
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not completely ignore the Ottomans, but does not mention the political elite surrounding 
the Sultan. In the journal, there are also articles that praise Ziya Gökalp.192 In a way 
Atsız tries to balance his militarist views with ‘cultural Turkism’ of the center. Atsız 
divides Turkish history into two as inside of the homeland, outside of it. In the 
homeland there is Turkistan, and outside of the homeland there is Turkey which starts 
with the Seljuks. Therefore, Atsız also does not bypass the Seljuks either. The journal 
was closed down after its seventeenth issue in which Atsız criticized Darülfünun 
because of its lack of discipline,193 and then Atsız was dismissed from assistantship.194  
The other important journal was Orhun, which was again published by Nihal 
Atsız. The first nine issues of Orhun appeared from 5 November 1933 to 16 July 1934; 
however the next seven were issued from 1 October 1943 to 1 April 1944. The 
contributors were almost the same with those of Atsız Mecmua; Orhan Şaik Gökyay, 
Nihat Sami Banarlı, Pertev Naili Boratav, Ali İhsan Sabis, Fethi Tevetoğlu and Fevziye 
Abdullah Tansel. Again most of the articles were written by Nihal Atsız himself. The 
themes were the same as the previous journal; glorification of the Turkish race through 
Turkish language, literature, and history. Orhun was more militant in mentioning the 
‘outside Turks.’ In addition to cultural emphasis, there are also articles in political 
tones. For example in one of the articles, Atsız argues that the Tatars are Turks and 
accordingly he praises Tatar activity in the Russian assembly.195 In another article, 
İsmail Gasprinski is praised because of his political activities.196 Atsız’s emphasis on 
carrying Turkish blood to be counted as Turk becomes very apparent.  He argues that 
there are Turks living in Lithuania. However there are non-Turks who carry ‘foreign 
blood’ in Turkey although some of them speak Turkish such as Jews and blacks.197 
Atsız also criticizes the history textbooks of the Ministry, and then the journal was 
closed.  
The point is that the Kemalist elite in order to establish the homogeneous 
definition of Turkishness which was based on race pushed for Turkism. However when 
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they challenged to the center, it took some precautions to obstruct them. Indeed with the 
centralizing measures of the RPP, many Pan-Turkist journals were closed down and 
importation of others from Europe was banned.198 In addition to this ‘internal threat,’ 
there was also a rising ‘external threat.’ The restoration of Germany’s internal strength 
and its ambitions had already produced a great threat for Turkey. Italy was emerging as 
a new potential threat in Mediterranean. In order to keep the borders safe, Turkey 
signed regional pacts. The main aim was to provide a balanced foreign policy, meaning 
making alliances with every state. Therefore not to involve any dispute with any state in 
this era of rising dictatorships, while at the same time appreciating Germany’s military 
and economic power. 199 In that context, the Pan-Turkist journals with irredentist tones 
might result with a bitter struggle with the Soviet Union. This was the last thing that the 
Turkish government wanted. The consequence was the closing down of Pan-Turkist 
journals for providing the supremacy, permanency and integrity of the Turkish State. 
The journals remained silent until 1939 when Mustafa Kemal died and İnönü 
called many Pan-Turkist leaders for appeasing with them so that pursuing calm internal 
affairs.200 In fact, taking their grounds from the same sources, what the Kemalists and 
journals pushed was basically same thing, Central Asian roots, except one being 
irredentist, and the other being ‘westernist.” This led to the considerations for 
preventing the ‘State.’ However the Pan-Turkist journals were already popularized 
among the new generation that learnt its Central Asian roots and the glory of Turkish 
race in schools. It was this environment when the Second World War broke out. 
 
3.3. New Hopes: Second World War: 
The outbreak of the Second World War stirred new hopes in the Pan-Turkist 
circles within Turkey and “outside Turks” for reaffirming their goals. Since the mid-
1930s, their activities were limited with the centralizing measures of the RPP. However 
the imposition of a race-based definition of Turkishness led to a symbiotic relationship 
with Pan-Turkism although the journals had remained silent until 1938. After the death 
of Mustafa Kemal, the call of some Pan-Turkist leaders like Rıza Nur and Zeki Velidi 
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Togan back to the country encouraged the new generation of the Pan-Turkists.201 In fact 
they already went through a Kemalist education through which they rediscovered their 
glorious origins. Indeed, the Second World War was near and it created the real 
motivation. Then depending on the government’s foreign policy considerations, the 
movement gained power also with the influence of German propaganda.  
 
At the top-official level, the Pan-Turkists were never supported overtly. The 
most important reason was that in the international arena, the Turkish government 
preferred to follow ‘active neutrality’ which was basically to make security alliances 
with all parts and keep Turkey outside the war. This was actually a ‘not-to join war’ 
policy.202 Therefore an overt support to the Pan-Turkists might lead to reactions from 
the Soviet Union. This was the last thing that the Turkish government wanted as the 
elite with the considerations of providing the integrity, sovereignty and permanency of 
the ‘State.’ Indeed the ‘National Chief,’ İsmet İnönü pursued a very cautious and 
prudent foreign policy.203 However, this necessitated taking stern measures to control 
political activities in the internal arena.204 Policies, like the Wealth Tax, which aimed at 
marginalizing the ‘non-Turks,’ were reached to their peak in this tense environment. 
These policies fertilized the racist ideas through creating a more strict definition of 
Turkishness within the borders of Turkey and also encouraged the Pan-Turkists at the 
ideological level. 
 
Indeed, the ‘active neutrality’ policy was largely the product emerging threats 
for Turkey. Since the mid-1930s, Italy was the major threat in Mediterranean. In order 
to secure its borders against Italy, Turkey signed a Balkan Pact with the small Balkan 
states. However the epact did not reach to its aim with the influence of the fact that 
there was no great power involved in it. Turkey found new allies with the Tripartite 
Alliance that it signed with Britain and France in October 1939. According to Hale, by 
this alliance Turkey accepted some responsibilities related with its possible assistance 
during the war, therefore this alliance indicates that Turkey was actually ready to enter 
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into a war.205 However the French army collapsed just at the beginning of the war in 
June 1940. Then Turkey’s plans were changed. In fact, the French army was thought to 
be the best army in Europe by the Turkish government, and now with this catastrophic 
incident discouraged Turkish government very much. In fact, Turkey’s possible 
participation in the war had depended on the assumption that the French fleet would be 
available to oppose Italy in Mediterranean. 206 
 
Following the French defeat Italy entered the war in 10 June 1940 and invaded 
Greece from Albania.207 The invasion of that close areas incited great anxiety in Turkey. 
Then a rapid rapprochement with a great power, Germany was on the scene. The two 
governments had already close relationships since the First World War in terms of trade 
and technical assistance. However İnönü and his close circle did not trust Germany for 
keeping Turkey’s integrity.208 They were right, because Germany was not really caring 
Turkey’s future for itself. The main aim of the German government was to provide itself 
a Lebensraum by attacking the Middle East which was controlled by Britain.209 In order 
to guarantee Turkey’s support, Germany signed another friendship agreement with 
Turkey. Only four days after this agreement in June 1941, Germany attacked Soviet 
Union.210 The German forces began taking areas of the Soviet Union inhabited by the 
Turkish-speaking people, then the German officials tried to convince Turkey. The 
reason was that if Turkey could be convinced, it might enter to the war and help the 
Germans to defeat the Soviet Union.211  
 
Germany had already launched an intensive and expensive Pan-Turkist and anti-
Soviet propaganda campaign in Turkey, through use of communications, schools and 
associations.212 It also got help from various Pan-Turkist youth associations in Turkey. 
In Turkey the number of pro-Germans was increasing day by day. Most of them were 
seeing this war as an opportunity to get new lands, therefore propagating war also with 
the influence of Germans. Some journalists even some among state-circles were calling 
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Turkey to join the war near Germany. In Cumhuriyet, for instance Nadir Nadi wrote 
several times on Turkey to join the war. Some other articles appeared in Tasvir-i 
Efkar.213 Furthermore since 1941, there had been confidential semi-official contacts 
between Turkey and Germany considering the Turkish-speaking groups under the 
Soviet Union. The main participants of the meetings were Franz von Papen, the German 
Ambassador to Ankara, Hüseyin Hüsnü Emir Erkilet, Tatar originated General and 
author of several articles in Pan-Turkist journals, Ali Fuad Erdem, a General and Nuri 
[Killigil] Pasha, the brother of Enver Pasha, who became a hero for the Pan-Turkist 
after he died on the way to reach Turan. These mainly discussed the possibility of a 
German-Turkish collaboration in propagating war. The focus of Germany was to gather 
soldiers from the Turkish-speaking prisoners of war in German camps.214 
  
Landau states that the Turkish government was very well aware of these semi-
official contacts with the Germans.215 If the status of the German participants to the 
meeting is thought there comes out an unequal relationship at the official level. Franz 
von Papen was an ambassador and the Turkish participants were retired generals. How 
these generals get this much power is needed to be discuss, there is also the possibility 
that they were not needed to be entitled by a higher authority in order to establish such 
contacts. They might have been encouraged from the political environment or they 
might have been entitled unofficially to realize those contacts. The conflict lies in the 
fact that while these unofficial contacts were going on, Turkey’s Ambassador to Berlin, 
Hüsnü Gerede, stated that Turkey had no territorial ambitions. The reason for this kind 
of an expression can be again Turkey’s cautious policy. Indeed in a report, von Papen 
declared that Şükrü Saraçoğlu, Turkey’s Minister of Foreign Affairs-later Prime 
Minister, had told him; “until Germany defeated the Soviet Union definitively, Turkey 
could not join Germany for fear of Soviet appraisals against the Turkic minorities 
there.”216 This shows the close circles were also in favor of war to get its 
opportunities.217 However at the official level, in order not to attract the attention of the 
Soviet Union, the Turkish government denied all irredentist claims.218 As Koçak argues 
the Turkish government wanted to keep the Pan-Turkist movement, which had 
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sympathizers in government itself, under close control. The main idea was to provide an 
emergency plan for applying in the case of a German victory.219  
 
Pan-Turkist groups in Turkey had the idea that this could be a great opportunity 
for realizing their aims. When Germany invaded Crimea and Caucasus in spring 1942, 
the Pan-Turkist hopes of both the official and non-official circles increased. In fact the 
speech by Şükrü Saraçoğlu, the Prime Minister; “We are Turk, Turkist will always be 
Turkist. For us being a Turkist is a matter of blood, culture and conscience” carried the 
expectations to the highest level. During Stalingrad, there became a flow of Pan-Turkist 
journals that were propagating for joining the war.  
 
 
3.4. “Ready to Fight!” 
  
               “He so immersed himself in those romances that 
 he spent whole days and nights over his books; 
 and thus with little sleeping and much reading his brains dried up to such a degree  
that he lost the use of his reason”  
 
Cervantes, Don Quixote de la Mancha, Book I, Part I 
 
 
Through the new journals of the late 1930s and 1940s, Ergenekon, Kopuz, 
Bozkurt, Tanrıdağ, Çınaraltı, Türk Yurdu, Geçit, Birlik, Büyük Ülkü, Kara İnci, and 
Gök-Börü, a pumping of the superiority of the Turkish race was on the scene. The 
journals constituted an alternative platform for the Turkists who did not have the 
opportunity of voicing their ideas in anywhere after the Turkish Hearths were closed. 
The interesting thing was that they were in general pursuing an ‘anti-Westernization’ 
discourse, which was the opposite of what the Kemalists strove for. However in order to 
eliminate Ottoman and Islamic roots, the Kemalist History Thesis pushed for Central 
Asian roots and the glory of the Turkish race like other nationalisms during this era of 
transition from empire to nation-states. Therefore the already existing symbiotic 
relationship between the varieties of Turkish nationalism was grown even more. Indeed 
the Kemalists had a huge intellectual accumulation since the eighteenth century. This 
accumulation had basically three elements; European racism, Ottoman modernization, 
and Russian dominance over the Turkish-speaking people. The Kemalist elite had the 
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motivation of eliminating Islamic and Ottoman components through a new 
consciousness of belonging which would instill people pride and the desire for 
becoming together. This could be realized through a Hobsbawmian invention of golden 
age, which would provide enough space for having a claim on the western civilization 
by negating Ottoman and Islamic pasts. The solution was to take toots back to the 
Central Asia and pushing for Central Asian-based Turkish nationalism. On the other 
hand, the people, the receiver of this identity, had to be kept together for the formation 
of a nation-state, while also had to be controlled for preventing any challenges to the 
common ideal. This was the point that created problems. Hence the construction of a 
homogeneous identity, Turkishness, and a Gellnerian imposition of it through the 
mechanisms of the modern state was both the quandary and solution.   
 
The journals of the Second World War were actually the products of this 
pushing for a Central Asian rooted Turkish race, which was assumed to be superior and 
establisher of many civilizations including ones that Europe took its roots. Their 
reactions mainly concentrated on the effort to make Turks part of ‘western civilization.’ 
The pushing of the Kemalists and the accumulation of knowledge for two hundred years 
were so great that these journals argued for Turks existence, not through ‘westernizing,’ 
but as being more Turkified, as being the center of the Turkish civilization. In that case, 
the Second World War, also with the influence of Germany, might provide ‘the sole 
opportunity’ for the unity of the Turks, Turkey being at the center. Then there happened 
a mushrooming of journals propagating war or at least propagating the superiority of the 
Turkish race at this period when Turkish nation needed an ideal-mefkure in the case of a 
possible entrance to the war. They all had different conciliation levels with the center. 
However in general, their closeness to the center at ideological level was encouraged 
them to pursue an irredentist political vision which had also supporters within the ‘non-
irredentist’ government. In addition, theirs was a clearly defined project; unification of 
all Turks; whereas the Kemalist project had a complex agenda that included different 
motivations. As a result, the latter failed to provide a life time mefkure, which would 
replace Shariah, for the ‘Turkish nation.’ The mefkure was supplied by the Pan-Turkist 
sources; such as the increasing number of Pan-Turkist journals which included articles 
on the superiority of the Turkish race, what to do’ lists for reaching to Turan, or poems 
of longing to the imaginary land of Turan. 
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Indeed, this flow of journals, during the war, had already given its signals in 
1938 with an ardent racist-nationalist; Reha Oğuz Türkkan, who was actively engaged 
in publishing journals and organizing the ‘nation.’ Born in 1920, Türkkan was among 
the second generation of the Pan-Turkists. In his high school years, he took classes from 
Fevziye Abdullah Tansel, the editor of Ülkü-the journal of People’s Houses, Behçet 
Kemal Çağlar, Mükrimin Halil Yinanç and Enver Benhar Şapolyo, all of who were 
known as the renowned teachers of the Kemalist period. His first writings were on 
nation and patrie which later carried him to the idea of the superiority of Turkish race 
probably as the result of pushing too much of Turkish race by the Kemalists and also 
their  failure to draw a line between racists and themselves except the case of 
irredentism that they continuously referred. Ergenekon became the first and, for this 
thesis, one of the most important platform that Türkkan voiced his racist and war-prone 
opinions. This journal was published in Ankara starting from 10 November 1938. Only 
four issues appeared. Its slogan was “The Turkish race above everything and the 
Turkish race above any other race.” There were also anti-Nazi writings of Türkkan 
along with the anti-communist ones.220  Then Ergenekon was closed down mainly 
because of its militant tone against Germany.221 In fact it was the time when Germany 
appeared as a strong state. Therefore Türkkan’s writings might lead to aggression. 
 
After Ergenekon, Türkkan began to publish Bozkurt, which had a more militant 
tone than the previous one with the influence of the on goings of the Second World 
War. Bozkurt at first appeared in 1940, then suspended since it published a map of 
Turkish lands in July 1941 with a writing addressing to İnönü in which Türkkan stated 
that the Turks were ready to fight and just waiting for his signal. Bozkurt resumed 
publication as a weekly on 5 March 1942 and continued irregularly until July. Its slogan 
was the same as that of Ergenekon: “Turkish race above all others.” The contributors 
were Nihal Atsız, Nejdet Sancar, Hüseyin Namık Orkun, Fethi Tevetoğlu, Peyami Safa, 
Ali İhsan Sabis, Behçet Kemal Çağlar, Zeki Velidi Togan, Abdülkadir İnan and Besim 
Atalay. A total of seventeen issues came out. This time Türkkan manly focused on 
educating the Turkists, in his words the Bozkurtçus. In his article called “The Credo of 
Bozkurtçu,” Türkkan at first informed the possible target group on what they believed: 
“the given superiority of the Turkish race and Turkish nation which is rooted from our 
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blood.” Therefore “Turks should not mix with other bloods.” Bozkurtçus need that 
blood “to war whenever it is necessary,” “to establish a Turkish State of sixty five 
million people.”222  
 
In August 1941, Çınaraltı began to be published by Orhan Seyfi Orhon and 
Yusuf Ziya Ortaç. It was a weekly journal appeared in İstanbul from 9 August 1941 to 
15 July 1944, reaching to 146 issues. It was republished in 1944, then also in 1948. 
Among the main contributors were Hüseyin Hüsnü Erkilet, İsmail Hakkı Akansel, Nihal 
Atsız, Nejdet Sançar, and Hüseyin Namık Orkun. Its slogan was İsmail Gasprinski’s 
‘unity in language, thought and action.’ In comparison to Ergenekon, Bozkurt, or the 
other journals, such as Tanrıdağ and Gök-Börü, Çınaraltı was more moderate generally. 
Its contributors were closer to Ziya Gökalp’s understanding of nation as a cultural unity, 
so that the creation of a national consciousness based on a common culture and 
common language was the ideal-mefkure of Çınaraltı.223 Accordingly, it had also an 
emphasis on Islam as one of the unifying factors. Instead of an irredentist blood-fetish 
that Türkkan clearly states in the Credo, Orhon drew the limits of Turkey and 
emphasized national unity in the ‘Credo of the Turkist.’224 The articles of Çınaraltı 
were mostly on history, language, literature and education. There were also attacks on 
communism.225  
 
The interesting thing is that Çınaraltı sometimes put emphasis on race 
conflicting with its general understanding. For instance, it writes on a project of 
building the honor gallery of Turkish history, in which “carrying pure Turkish blood” is 
counted as one of the principal criteria of being in the list.226 Besides, in the letters from 
readers, mostly teachers and students, blood tie and race are emphasized as the building 
elements of the Turkish nation. This double-sidedness implies that Ortaç and Orhon 
were close to the political circles; therefore they drew such a large framework that they 
could gather many different elements under the same roof. However, the readers were 
mostly the missioners of the Kemalist History Thesis which learned or taught the 
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glorious history of Turkish race. This pushing, combined with the specific conditions of 
the war might nurture more an exclusionary discourse. 
 
Furthermore, the central writings of Çınaraltı did not seem that aggressive about 
the ‘outside Turks.’ For instance while Bozkurt makes calls to İnönü to take action, 
Çınaraltı states that “Turkish state does not have an intention of attacking to any other 
state,”227 however “we should not forget that we are the children of a glorious nation.” 
In that context, it can be said that Çınaraltı adopted a parallel stance to the government 
in the case of neutrality during the war; however it is also not very happy for seeming 
peace-prone or neutral. In fact, Çınaraltı was trying to walk on the line between 
showing aggressiveness to the government and conciliating with it. This must be the 
explanation for its long-time survival in the Turkish Press. 
 
Tanrıdağ was the other important journal of the Second World War. It was 
published as weekly from 8 May to 4 September 1942. After the death of its editor, Rıza 
Nur, it was closed until 5 November 1950. Although Rıza Nur was setting the tone with 
his articles, there were other important contributors; Nihal Atsız, Nejdet Sançar, İsmail 
Hakkı Akansel, Hasan Ferid Cansever, Fethi Tevetoğlu, and Hüseyin Namık Orkun. 
One of the aims of the journal was to purify the Turkish language; therefore pure 
Turkish words are used in titles and dates. Similarly to other journals, writers of 
Tanrıdağ also discussed the superiority of the Turkish race.228 The general tone is 
militant and there are calls to war. For instance in one of the articles Nejdet Sançar 
writes that “army and war is the oldest friend of Turk.” “In this world of struggles, 
Turkish nation should bring up fighters.”229 In that context “our nationalism should be a 
racist one” depending on the unifying nature of race, and separatist nature of nation. 
Therefore Turkish nationalism should be neither peaceful nor utopian but based on a 
historical analysis.230 
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Besides, Tanrıdağ included addresses to youth. One of them is very interesting 
in the sense that it makes a call to learn history by making research not by reading the 
works of Europeans.231 In another one, it is argued that the current decayed situation of 
the world was mainly rooted from the lack of discipline.232 The publisher-editor, Rıza 
Nur, contributes to these aggressive calls with his classification of Turkist movements. 
According to him, there are three kinds of Turkish nationalism: Turanism, Turkism and 
Anatolianism. The first one is being integrated to the second one, because the real 
Turan origin belonged to Central Asia which was the Turks’ homeland. The second one 
includes all Turks, and the third one is so isolated so that does not accept any other 
Turks than the ones living in Anatolia. It is true that Anatolia should be paid special 
attention, but Anatolianism is absolutized the definition of Turkishness, and so that 
weakened the impact of nationalism through centralization. Hence he concluded that 
‘racial Pan-Turkism’ is the most viable and living option.233  
 
 Thus in this intellectual environment, on 5 November 1942, Gök-Börü, a 
militant and aggressive journal as Tanrıdağ, Bozkurt or Ergenekon, appeared It was 
published by Türkkan after his elimination from Bozkurt. This incident, in fact, 
crystallized the leadership struggle between two Atsız and Türkkan. Then, Gök-Börü 
became the medium that Türkkan attempted to prove his leadership by distinguishing 
him and his group from others. Therefore, Gök-Börü was extra aggressive and militant 
in that war atmosphere. Having a combination of these interests in mind, Türkkan 
engaged in systematizing the Turkist movement probably for claiming its ownership. In 
the journal, he gave both theories and actions through a master pumping of Turkist 
elements most of which could conciliate with both the Kemalist History Thesis and the 
general political environment that the war had created. This pumping served for another 
purpose as well; exclusion of Atsız, who did not have an easy relationship with the 
government historically, firstly because of his emphasis on the existence of a national 
spirit instead of racial purity among the Turks; and secondly because of his closeness to 
Zeki Velidi Togan, who was taken from his post in the İstanbul University following his 
reactions in the first history congress. Gök-Börü became the platform for that feud 
between Türkkan and Atsız. Combined also with the aggressiveness of the war years, it 
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presents a good concretization of how the accumulated knowledge was used in a time of 
war between states and war between the Turkists.   
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CHAPTER IV: 
 
 
                                       GÖK-BÖRÜ 
                                                           .                                               
                                                                                                                   
                                                                                                                      “Sor Tunaya nedendir bu ağlayışı 
Kıyılarındaki Türk kalelerinden  
Suyuna bir destan yası vurunca! 
…. 
Sor Tunaya nedendir bu ağlayışı 
Rüyasında bir TÜRK’ün aksi durunca.” 
 
Bülent ECEVİT, Gök-Börü, (6: 1 November 1943) 
  
4.1. The birth of Gök-Börü: 
 
Gök-Börü is the product of an aggressive period very basically. The Second 
World War incited new hopes for the Pan-Turkists by making them reaffirm their goals. 
The long term accumulated knowledge of two hundred years was combined with the 
propaganda machine of Germany. The result was a concrete and determined agenda 
fertilized by the Kemalist History Thesis which created Turkishness depending on a 
golden age myth. As the German forces began to conquer areas close to the Soviet 
Union which dominated Turkish-speaking people of Central Asia, the Pan-Turkist 
circles and also some nationalists of the government, taking the opportunity of the day, 
made calls for joining the war near Germany. Although İnönü, the Prime Minister, did 
not actually follow a war-prone policy particularly because of his concern on the 
integrity of the Turkish state, the racist policies of the Turkish ‘State’ mechanism had 
already created the suitable environment for the militant and racist propaganda. Gök- 
Börü was one of these propagandist platforms with its aggressive leaning on 
homogenizing Turkey and unifying all ‘real’ Turks. 
 
Besides the specific conditions that the Second World War had already created, 
Gök-Börü was rather aggressive since it was born out of an internal struggle in the 
Turkist movement. Nihal Atsız and Reha Oğuz Türkkan were the two prominent writers 
of Bozkurt since 1939. Türkkan, being a young and talented Turkist, was appreciating 
Atsız since he was the “second great Turkist after Ziya Gökalp in this struggle of 
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Turkism.”234 In the movement, Atsız had a very charismatic Nietzschean stance; so that 
he could wait for years without publishing a journal after the suspensions of Atsız 
Mecmua and Orhun. On the other hand, Türkkan was an ardent racist-nationalist who 
was very active in publishing journals and brochures and also organization of the 
movement. In 1939, right after the first suspension of Bozkurt, he established 
Kitapsevenler Kurumu (Booklovers’ Association) headed by Fethi Okyar, the minister 
of Justice235 and Türkkan’s father’s close friend, in order to gather both old and new 
Turkists under the same roof and organize their publications as to balance the new 
translations from western literature by the government.236 As the first work, Ziya 
Gökalp’s Türkçülüğün Esasları was published. After a short time, the association was 
closed in April 1940.237  
 
Objectively, with his arduous work and his father, Halit Ziya Türkkan238 who 
had very close relationships with official circles, Türkkan was the biggest rival for 
Atsız. The closing of Bozkurt, particularly because of Atsız’ writings created a big 
tension between the two figures; the publisher of the journal, Türkkan warned Atsız 
about his writings. The reaction of Atsız was bitter; the general directors and owners 
Sami Karayel and Nurullah Barıman were on the same side with Atsız. As the result, 
Türkkan was dismissed from the journal’s editorial board, and then Atsız took the 
control of Bozkurt.239  
 
The product of the feud between Türkkan and Atsız was Gök-Börü which was 
began to be published by Türkkan in November 1942. This new journal became a new 
platform for the dispute. Through various articles, Türkkan and his group blamed Atsız. 
The article by Cihat Savaş Fer, in the first issue of Gök-Börü, was the first and foremost 
important one in presenting the inner side of the Turkist movement along with the 
future prospect of Türkkan and his group. In “Hesap Veriyoruz!,” Fer declares that they 
eliminated the unreal Turkists among themselves because of their inappropriate 
behaviors. These unreal ones are emotional and irrational Atsız, embezzler Nurullah 
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Barıman, who took the money of Bozkurt, and traitor Çınaraltı writers, who did not 
support the republication of Bozkurt themselves. The real ones are one who remained 
loyal to the movement. Those are real Bozkurtçus gathered around Türkkan.240 The 
dispute continued with Atsız’ brochure of “Hesap Böyle Verilir!.” Then as a reaction, 
Türkkan published Kuyruk Acısı (The Grudge). Besides, in the writings, at first Atsız 
blamed Türkkan for his disrespectful and immoral, so non-Turkish behaviors and then 
called him as Ermenikan (Armenian-blood, instead of Türkkan-Turkish-blood). 
Türkkan, in return, accused Atsız of having a dolichocephalic skull unlike real Turks 
who are brachycephal.241 This kind of insults were the last things that those ‘real Turks’ 
might want to hear. 
 
 Actually, Atsız and Türkkan were not the substitutes of each other. Their racism 
understandings were different. Atsız claimed that the Turks had ethnic consciousness 
which was transferred by birth even in the case of a semi-pure Turkish blood, meaning 
having an alien parent. Therefore instead of a racial purity, it is this factor of ethnic 
consciousness and national spirit which constituted Turkish states, each of which can be 
taken as the continuation of the other. In the picture of Atsız, the Turkish Republic 
stands as a continuation of the Ottoman Empire. Türkkan, on the other hand, focused on 
unchanged specific features that made Turks establish different states. His guide was 
anthropological elements through which he argued that Turkish race is hereditary and 
its superiority should be prevented from degenerating through exclusion of alien 
elements.  
 
For the Kemalist History Thesis and Gök-Börü followers, this understanding 
based on racial purity provided enough space for the inclusion of the Sumerians and 
Hittites into the picture of Turkishness via anthropological research. On the other hand, 
for Atsız, this claim of ownership of some alien civilizations, in order to prove the 
superiority of the Turkish race, was irrational. Turkish race did not need these alien 
ones for displaying its superiority. Despite this difference in their understandings, both 
Atsız and Türkkan were writing together in Bozkurt in 1939. However their leadership 
struggle uncovered the difference. This may show that the main problem among them 
was actually their race for leadership. Thus, in addition to the impact of the Second 
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World War, Gök-Börü, as a journal, was the product of this dispute between two 
prominent men of the movement. Then it continued its life as a stage for the efforts of 
self-defining of a group of Turkists in this war environment. 
 
 
4.2. Gök-Börü at the First Sight: 
 
The journal was first published in 5 November 1942 in İstanbul. It regularly 
appeared twice a month until 20 May 1943 as thirteen issues. In general, the number of 
pages is 23 to 25. There are mostly articles, in addition are memoirs, small stories, 
poems, caricatures and several photographs. Its slogan is the same as Ergenekon and 
Bozkurt; “Turkish Race above any Race!” Besides, in accordance with the previous 
disputes it is continuously stated that “This journal is belonged to real Turkists.” The 
symbol of the journal is a grey wolf which is situated in the middle of a crescent. In the 
first issue the meaning of the journal’s name and symbol is explained. According to 
this, Gök-Börü means Grey Wolf which is considered to be the unifying symbol of all 
Turks. It is believed that the Turks are the descendents of the Grey Wolf which leaded 
them since an immemorial time. Whenever they are decentralized the flag of Grey Wolf 
has become the unifying signal so that the Great Turkish Unity has been formed. It is 
the Father of all Turks and its spirit always observes the Turks. If there is a hard 
situation, the God sends to Turks a grey wolf manifested in the body and spirit of the 
most superior Turk. The brave, militant, and hardworking spirit of the first grey wolf is 
manifested in these other grey-wolves. In that case all Turks should work idealistically 
for the rise of Turkish race, in order to be grey wolves.242  
 
Besides, in almost every issue of Gök-Börü is a special section titled “Grey 
Wolves in Turkish History.” These are; the Seljuk ruler Alparslan, who opened the gate 
of Anatolia to the migrated Turks and provided their settlement in Anatolia in the 
eleventh century; the ruler of Turkestan Timur, who was a great organizer in terms of 
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state mechanism, also took European lands and fought against Chinese Empire in the 
fifteenth century; Babürşah, who was the founder of Indian-Turkish Empire and favored 
the use of Turkish language in the sixteenth century; Atabek Gök-Börü, who dominated 
Kirkuk in the twelfth century; Barbaros, who made Mediterranean a Turkish lake in the 
sixteenth century; and lastly Yıldırım, who provided Turkish unity for the first time.243 
This is probably an incomplete list since the journal was closed after its thirteenth issue; 
however it is still significant for grasping the main tenets of Gök-Börü’s perspective. As 
it can be seen from the names; there are both Islamic and pre-Islamic figures. Besides, 
the authors also call Atatürk as grey wolf in various places.244 This mixture shows that 
religion was not the determining criteria, but ‘contributing to the efforts of reaching 
Turan’ is the key element. With this emphasis on Turkish unity, religious or non-
Central Asian sides of this particular figure are eliminated, in order to fit it to the 
general picture as in the case of Ottoman Sultans.  
 
This general perspective of Gök-Börü was formed by the contributors to the 
journal. Although Türkkan was setting the general tone also using the pen-name of 
Reha Kurtuluş245 there were a large number of writers. These included; Cihat Savaş Fer, 
Prof. Dr. Zeki Velidi Togan, Besim Atalay (Deputy to Kütahya), Dr. Raşid Hatipoğlu 
(Minister of Agriculture), Aydın Yalçın (Assistant of Sociology), Reşat Nuri Güntekin 
(Deputy to Çanakkale), Mehmet Halit Bayrı, Prof.Dr. Abdülkadir İnan, Nuri Akgün, 
Prof. Mahmut R. Kösemihal, Şakir Ülkütaşır, Mehmet Öztürk, Dr Mustafa Hakkı 
Akansel, Ziya Tataç (Assistant Director in an Eti Bank branch), Tahir Olgaç, Zeki 
Sofuğlu, O. Bozkurt, Nebil Buharalı (Director of National Library), Kemal Hakkı Kut, 
Dr. A.N.Y., Dr. Osman Turan, Prof. Dr. Süreyya Aygün, Prof. Dr. Ziyaeddin Fahri 
Fındıkoğlu, Prof. Dr. Akdes Nimet Kurat, Nuri Demirağ, Dr. Tevfik Zarakol, Hayrettin 
Karan (Deputy to Balıkesir), M.Altunbay, Tesbihçioğlu, Raif Samur, Mahmut Esat 
Bozkurt, and Orhan Uygun.  
 
In the list are both well-known and unknown names. The interesting thing is that 
there are deputies and ministers among them. Despite their being a part of the state 
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circle, they wrote in such an aggressive journal. This is a small example that the 
movement had its supporters in state circles despite the journals’ continuous suspension. 
The other point that is worth mentioning is the professors. These were mostly 
Turcology professors supplying the cultural side of the journal. There are also doctors 
who wrote on biology. Actually, since everybody writes according to his/her own 
interests, the journal has writings on many issues from agriculture to books, of course 
all having the same discourse. This is an implication that the journal is an activist one 
which has its agenda in every aspect of the life. There are also several teachers and 
students writing in the part of reader letters. The letters came from Kars, Ankara, 
Kayseri, İstanbul, Adana, Manisa, Kırşehir, Eskişehir, Trabzon, Uşak, and Azerbaycan. 
If these letters are real ones, it can be said that the journal was fairly popular. On the 
other hand, these letters may be fake, written by the editorial board itself. This is a 
methodological problem that obstructs seeing the degree of popularity.  
 
Furthermore, two important Turkists, Fethi Tevetoğlu and İsmet Tümtürk give 
some figures about the sales. According to them, the sales of Pan-Turkist journals 
increased after 1942. In that case, Gök-Börü, Tanrıdağ and Türk Yurdu sold almost 
three thousand issues, which was more than Atsız Mecmua of 1931.246 However the 
figures could not reach those of the journals of People’s Houses and leftist ones. For the 
case of People’s Houses, it is understandable. With a good communication network 
under the control of Turkish state, the People’s Houses journals could easily reach to 
their places, they might be even being published in more than one places, and 
distributed to every official institution. This may increase their sales. However, for Gök-
Börü, the communications network was limited. Therefore in the process of distributors 
met with a lot of problems as it is written in small notes. The editorial board asks the 
Post Office for one thousand copies which did not reach Ankara.247 Then one moth after 
it is understood that the journals were sent to Erzurum mistakenly, and half of them 
were lost on the road.248 At the end, it can be declared that with some practical 
problems, Gök-Börü had nearly three thousand readers in accordance with the general 
trend of the day. If the letters are to be taken as real, it seems that it was read 
particularly by teachers and students.     
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4.3. Gök-Börü’s Self-Definition and other Pan-Turkists: 
 
   The feud between Atsız and Türkkan constituted the basis for Gök-Börü’s 
definition of itself. The editor, Türkkan, and his close friend Fer, strove to show that 
Gök-Börü was different from other journals so that it signified the peak of a new era in 
Turkism after a period of silence. They continuously state that “this is a journal by ‘real 
Turkists’ for ‘the real Turkists.”249 Through these words Atsız and others were called as 
‘unreal’ ones. Besides, it is emphasized that “becoming a Turkist and seeming as 
Turkist are different things.”250 Here the stone hits again Atsız and the ones who 
supported him against Türkkan. In fact, Türkkan also claims that the cadre of Çınaraltı 
is total “enemies to the ideal,” because of their writings criticizing Gök-Börü.251 In this 
case Türkkan, confidently from himself and his supporters, states that Gök-Börü writers 
could be sued because of their assumed insults to other writers, but they are right in the 
sense that they, themselves, are the real pure nationalists252 whom were envied by the 
others253 that try to give harm to Turkism through lies and slanders.254 
 
Accordingly, an outline is constructed by Fer to show the role of ‘real Turkists’-
Bozkurtçus, in the history of Turkism. This outline is comprised of six different stages 
in Turkism. The first one is the period of separated Turkists, during which Turkism was 
not a unified movement. Its principals were gathered from many different and scattered 
sources like Mete, Orhun inscriptions, Kaşgarlı Mahmud, İsmail Gasprinski and 
Süleyman Pasha. The systematization of the movement begins with Ziya Gökalp in the 
second stage. That great philosopher created the movement by compiling its principles 
from different sources. The third stage is the period of advancement. Following the War 
of Independence Turkism became almost the official ideology with the great Grey Wolf 
Atatürk, the realizer of what Gökalp created. Turkish Hearths, the journal Türk Yurdu 
(Turkish Homeland), Rıza Nur, Hamdullah Suphi, Hasan Ferit, Ahmet Ağaoğlu, and 
Yusuf Akçura were all influential during this period. Then the period of decadence and 
struggle comes. This is the period that the Turkish Hearths were suspended and so that 
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pursuing Turkist ideal was considered to be opposition. The Turkists dispersed. The 
fifth period is the period of silence that began in 1934 with the closing of Turkist 
journals. During this period the Turkish youth decayed because they had no ideal. Since 
1935, the period of Bozkurtçus is on the scene. These are a group of idealist young men 
gathered around Türkkan. They are striving for the revival of Turkism despite various 
interruptions meaning both the suspensions and also treachery of Atsız and others. Gök-
Börü is the product of this revival period.255  
 
Thus Gök-Börü defines itself as the ‘real idealist’256 and ‘real Bozkurtçu’ 
differently than Atsız and others who continued to publish Bozkurt. It creates its own 
golden age discourse which includes all Turkists and also Mustafa Kemal, but which at 
the end excludes ‘non-idealist’ and ‘unreal’ ones. Claiming the inheritance of the 
movement since its very beginning, Gök-Börü eliminates others and presents itself as 
the sole owner of Turkism. At that point the inclusion of Atatürk as the realizer of what 
was created before is important for seeing the conciliation points with the center and 
legitimization of the movement. This conciliation was not a forcefully stated one; 
instead what he learnt and lived took Türkkan to that conclusion on Atatürk’s 
contribution to the Turkist idea. In his mind, he and Gök-Börü is to be understood in the 
same vein.  
 
The second element in Gök-Börü’s self-definition against other Turkists is its 
project. According to the tableau by Türkkan, the ultimate aim of the Bozkurtçus is 
reaching the Greater Turkestan. However this can take for a while, because there are 
some other issues that should be dealt with. On this way purifying the blood in Turkey 
is considered to be the first step that goes to the Great Unity. The second issue is 
‘nationality,’ which means providing nationalization in every aspect of life, the third 
one includes the issues of morality, youth and education, family and woman. Then the 
issues of village, industry, science, administration, and religion come. According to 
Türkkan, when these issues beginning with Turkey are settled, the ultimate goal will be 
realized. The point is that Türkkan does not make a distinction between a cultural and 
political unity in saying, nor other writers may be deliberately.   
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Türkkan then, with the anxiety of proving that Bozkurtçus are different, gives 
two tableaus of other movements for comparing their aims. In the Turancı one, there are 
only two issues to be dealt with; reaching Turan-Greater Turkestan and then creating a 
nation mostly not depending on race. In other words, Turancıs took Türkkan’s first 
issues to deal with as the next ones after the unity was realized. Türkkan finds this 
unrealistic. In the Anatolianist one, on the other hand, the ultimate goal of reaching the 
Turan is not the determining characteristic. Although it starts with the same issues of 
Gök-Börü, the tableau is completed in the issue of administration. The ‘Outside Turks’ 
does not exist. Türkkan states that Anatolianists either believe in the unification of all 
Turks but however thinks that this can be realized only one or two centuries later or 
believe that Anatolia is enough for the Turks. According to Türkkan, the Unity is not 
that far away as the Anatolianists argue. It would be realized in a very close time if 
Turkists work hard for the rise of Turkish race.257  
 
Thus, Türkkan, in the article, draws a road map for the Turkists by arguing that 
there are some issues within the borders of Turkey, and these should be dealt at first, 
then the Unity will be realized. By criticizing the others, Türkkan tries to explain that 
his plan is the most realistic and also determinant one on the way reaching to Turan. In 
this way, first the purification of the Turkish race comes to the scene as the first 
condition. In fact, Türkkan’s classification of movements is very similar to Rıza Nur’s 
threefold division. Rıza Nur also pays special attention to Anatolia and argues for 
elimination of non-Turks from Anatolia. From 1920s to his death in 1942, Rıza Nur was 
one of the prominent supporters of Turkification of Anatolia.258 However his ultimate 
goal was not to stay limited by Anatolia. He pushed for Turan as Türkkan did. In fact 
Rıza Nur, similarly to Türkkan, complained from Anatolianists’ not caring of the 
ultimate end. Accordingly, Gök-Börü mentions Rıza Nur in an admired manner in its 
first issue and calls him as the greatest militant Turk.259   
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4.4. Gök-Börü and Ülkü: 
 
Gök-Börü legitimizes its existence in the eyes of its followers through claiming 
the ownership of the real Turkist movement. In fact since they developed in the same 
pool, the legitimization came naturally. There was also another point that the journal 
had to somehow provide its survival. It had to conciliate with the central ideology at 
some point also for practical purposes. In other words, the conciliation was a necessity 
for the continuation of the journal, but it was at the same time the natural outcome of 
the cross-fertilization between the Kemalist ideology and Turkism of Gök-Börü.  
 
At the very basic level, the ideal of the Kemalist elite was to Turkify Anatolia 
and to make some reforms. The guiding principles, as later stated in 1931 in RPP’s first 
programme, were the Six Arrows. They stand for unchallengeable and absolute tenets of 
the Kemalist project, which assign the Turks living in Turkey the duty of protecting 
their nation’s integrity and sovereignty with their whole existence while at the same 
time elevating their nation-state to the level of contemporary civilizations. Therefore 
what the Kemalist elite outlined as the basis of the project is nationalism and 
nationalization; which can go even further to eliminate all foreign elements.  
 
Taking this emphasis on nationalism as the reference point, Gök-Börü easily fits 
into the picture. The ultimate aim of it was reaching to Turan, on this way to Turan, 
Turkifying Anatolia and then flourishing of it constitutes the foremost levels as the 
Kemalists very basically aimed at. Here, if one adds the long years’ accumulation of 
knowledge about nations and nationalism into the picture, it is seen that a synergy 
existed among all these. They were all nurtured from one another. This is the reason 
why Gök-Börü fits into the picture of ‘normal’ Turkish nationalism easily. This 
penetration is so clear that Reşat Nuri Güntekin, writing in Gök-Börü, could declare the 
Six Arrows as also the basic principles of Gök-Börü260 without feeling any disturbance 
or Gök-Börü writers could easily put Mustafa Kemal in the list of grey wolves. Very 
similarly the Kemalist elite pursued racism for Turkifying Anatolia by pushing for 
Central Asian roots. Of course they are two different ideological structures; however 
none of the myths, symbols, concepts, or images relating with the Turkish nation are 
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actually under the monopoly of two versions of Turkish nationalism. Both use them 
depending on the context since their springs were almost the same. Then, Six Arrows of 
the Kemalists can also become main ülküs for Gök-Börü writers or some leftist writers 
of the time or even for today’s writers.  
 
Another point is that, very similar to the Thesis, the entire argument of Gök-
Börü is based on the assumption that the Turks were a nation since an immemorial time 
and they established many states. Türkkan presents a brief story of these states 
beginning with Huns which was leaded by the Grey Wolf Mete, then Gök Türks and 
Timurid Empire come, and the list goes until Atatürk.261 These are all ‘nation-states’ 
established by the ‘Turks’ as the Kemalist History Thesis emphasized. This means the 
Kemalists and Gök-Börü writers followed the same path for exalting the Turkish race, 
so the nation.  Besides, in Gök-Börü the leader is very important for providing the unity. 
The same applies to the Kemalist project in which Mustafa Kemal is a cult figure. These 
are not surprising. Here a prominent point to make is that as Türkkan’s Introduction to 
Turkism and Şerafettin Turan’s work shows, the reading lists of Türkkan and Mustafa 
Kemal includes many common books. Thus, one should keep all these ideological 
penetrations in mind while reading Gök-Börü. 
 
 The main eye-catching ideological point that defines Gök-Börü is its anti-
westernization stance. The Kemalist History Thesis was the product of the rejection of 
Islamic and Ottoman heritages; and so that the projection of present to the past with a 
golden age discourse. Gök-Börü, on the other hand, came out as a reaction to 
westernization along with the non-Turkish elements of Islamic and Ottoman legacies. 
The main of argument of Gök-Börü on this issue rests on the relationship between 
imitation and lacking of ülkü-ideal.262 It goes as the following; Turks could not uncover 
their national consciousness despite the fact that they constitute a nation, a superior one 
since an immemorial time. They imitated different civilizations since the very 
beginning. At that point, Zarakol explains the reasons for their adoption in a very much 
similar to the Kemalist History Thesis. According to him, the main reason for this was 
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the high intelligence level of Turks; so that as soon as they understood that the other one 
could not adapt them, the adopted to the alien civilization.263  
 
Türkkan, on the other hand, was not that optimistic on the imitation issue. He 
states that Turks did not have the proper national consciousness; therefore throughout 
history they remained under the influence of many other civilizations. For instance, 
while living in Central Asia, Turks tended to be like the ancient Chinese. Turkish begs 
used Chinese names and married Chinese women. After they adopted Islam, they turned 
out to be more Arabic, more Persian than the real Arabs or Persians.264 The Seljuks 
forgot their Turkishness as they became Islamic. Instead they enriched the Arabic and 
Persian culture by entering under the dominance of them. The Ottomans handed the 
administration over the non-Turk devshirmes; Caucasians, Albanians and Rums, who 
later dominated artistic and intellectual life. The Turkish Law left its place to Fıkıh and 
Mecelle.265  
 
Besides, the lack of consciousness led to conflicts among Turks themselves; so 
that Timur fought Bayazıt, Turkish Safavids fought Turkish Yavuz.266 In the nineteenth 
century, although Namık Kemal cried for his nation and homeland in his poetry, 
Abdulhamit’s absolutism limited this revival of national consciousness, because of 
intriguers who wanted to stroke the nation from inside.267 Then the Turkish essence was 
again shadowed. Accordingly, the lack of national consciousness led to the dissolution 
of the Ottoman Empire and Turks’ humiliation in front of the whole world. Although 
there appeared a small revival during the War of Independence, it did not continue 
much.268  
 
While mentioning the influence of Islam and Ottoman, Türkkan actually 
emphasizes very similar things to the Kemalist discourse. In the case for eliminating 
those roots, the nation-builders focused on the negative effects of these two legacies of 
the Turks’ civilization. The difference is that Türkkan focuses on ‘us’ while mentioning 
lack of national consciousness unlike the Thesis which presents Turks as a fulltime 
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nation having national consciousness; but badly influenced by Islam and the Ottomans. 
Türkkan connects that influence to Turks’ lack of consciousness, instead of being 
deceived by ‘external enemies.’ Both take the War of Independence as one of their 
reference points for the revival of Turkish national consciousness.  
 
However while the Kemalist elite pushes for Westernization with the aim of 
‘reaching to the contemporary level of civilizations,’ Gök-Börü emphasizes more 
Turkification for becoming a rising civilization. In that case, for the journal, 
westernization is another danger like the Ottomans or Islam that leads to the decay of 
Turkish civilization. This discussion on westernization goes hand in hand with a critique 
of the Turkish History Thesis. According to Türkkan, the new history reform was going 
towards nationalization under the guidance of Mustafa Kemal; however at the end it 
turned out to claiming the ownership of all of world civilizations. In accordance with 
that claim, Türkkan states that, instead of national legends and Kutadgu Bilig; 
Odysseus, Sophocles, Euripides, and Aristophanes were printed. Turkish students learnt 
not Yoluk Tigin, Bilge Tonyukuk, or Timur; but learnt Machiavelli, Xenophon, and 
Napoleon. The number of scholarships for the Turcology Institute was only six, whereas 
it was fifteen for the English and French branches.269  
 
In the same vein, Türkkan emphasizes that the new generation which was mostly 
educated in Europe, brought Europe here to Turkey while returning. They adopted 
European culture and traditions; so that all weddings, ceremonies, clothes, 
entertainment, architecture, literature, language became the imitators of that foreign 
culture.270 As a result they became individualists who did not care national issues.271 
Tespihçioğlu adds America to the picture and complains Turkish youth’s listening of 
American music According to him, Americans do not love their nation and homeland as 
Turks love.272 Furthermore, this anti-westernization and its results theme is repeated in 
various caricatures by Sadettin Topuzoğlu in a teasing manner for explaining that these 
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people became so funny since they adopted another civilization other than theirs.273 
Tahir Olgaç contributes to the journal through some small stories in which he depicted 
the disrespectfulness of new ‘westernized’ youth and bad habits; such as admiring 
luxury, and gambling.274  
 
What Gök-Börü very basically argues is that imitation of any civilization results 
with the weakening of the essence of the Turks. Since they adopted alien civilizations, 
their spirits became an artificial one that could be dissolved in any crisis as it happened 
now. While mentioning all these, the journal does not make any word for Mustafa 
Kemal’s westernization. This is understandable by referring to non-approachability and 
non-touchability of Mustafa Kemal even today. İsmet İnönü also was not mentioned in 
a negative manner. However there are critics to the state circles for leading to that 
corruption in social life, but these were not made through showing the target directly; 
just the problems of life, particularly in the economic arena, are declared. For instance 
Aydın Yalçın, in a scientific way, explains how and why inflation occurs.275 Raşid 
Hatipoğlu attracts attention to rising tax burden on villagers and then adds that “both the 
state and nation must think on this.” 276 Similarly, Reha Kurtuluş (Türkkan) tells some 
economic problems and gives suggestions for solving them; while at the same time 
praises the government of Saraçoğlu for thinking on both the state officers and others in 
giving material aid.277  
 
The point is that Gök-Börü does not establish a direct connection between the 
economic problems and the top-level of state; even justifies the policies of the top-
circles by praising them. Instead, as in the case of Aşık Huzuri, who depicts the 
corruptibility of state officers in People’s House of Kayseri,278 the emphasis is on 
peripheral offices of the state. Within that picture, Mustafa Kemal is placed as ‘our 
Father’ and Bozkurt, after whom charlatans and treacheries increased; İsmet İnönü is 
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the ‘National Chief;’ who encourages the Turkists with his populist sayings.279 It is also 
worth noting that in the picture, the ones who were against Mustafa Kemal and wanted 
American mandate are severely criticized by Gök-Börü.280 The authors have enough 
space to do this. Besides, they somehow combine the goals of the Kemalist elite, 
particularly those of Mustafa Kemal with their own goals. In that case, Mustafa Kemal, 
as the Bozkurt, paved the first step for reaching to Turan, however some other people 
around him opposed to this since they are so much westernized that they lost their 
Turkishness. 
 
Gök-Börü, in general, emphasizes that this corruption in social and economic life 
can be the sign of future dissolution, in fact, what the Turks met throughout history was 
that dissolving of its unity as in the case of the Ottoman Empire. The solution, 
according to Türkkan, is to create a dynamic renaissance from this decayed civilization 
of the Turks through rediscovering nationality in both spiritual and material matters. By 
this way of nationalization in all aspects of the life, the Turks could return to their 
glorious age after long years of sleep.281 What Türkkan argues is a more inclusive 
version of nationalization than Gökalp who declares that only technical matters should 
be borrowed. In fact, Türkkan states that Gökalp’s formula of westernization was 
misunderstood by the Turks primarily because of lack of national consciousness and 
then they have forgotten their Turkishness.  In this case, Türkkan sees his formula of 
nationalization as the solution to prevent this wrong going. While pushing for 
Turkification in every area, Türkkan also states that foreign books will be translated into 
Turkish, foreign music will also be listened; but the axis will not pass through the 
middle; instead Turkish will have more space. He shows Japan’s rising as an example of 
this nationalization in all aspects of the life, but with small western nuances, which do 
not occupy a large space.282 It seems that Türkkan considers these small nuances as a 
future prospect; therefore they can only have place after Turks provided their national 
unity; not in the process itself. 
 
Hence, in order to bring the glorious days back, a deep revolution of nationality 
pursuing, not a moderate one, but the most ardent and extremist version of nationalism 
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is required.283 This version is racism was planned to be helpful in terms of realizing the 
first issue on the road map of the Bozkurtçus; purifying and homogenizing the blood 
through a racist definition of Turkishness.  
 
 
4.5. Race and Nationalization: 
          “Bir milletin iç bünyesini derin surette değiştirmek için elli nesil kafi değildir.” 
                                                                                                  Mussolini, 1942 Cf. Gök-Börü (3: 15 December 1942)  
  
The definition of Turkishness in Gök-Börü constitutes of three elements; race, 
language and culture. In that case, a Turk is a member of the Tur race, speaks Turkish, 
and carries Turkish culture. These elements are hereditary, passes from one generation 
to the next and they are the determinants of the level of civilization. Hence the starting 
points of Gök-Börü are also the main tenets of Kemalist History Thesis. By this way the 
antiquity of Turkish nation is assumed, so that the nationalists-racists ‘rediscover’ the 
roots of that nation. This nation can be in somnolence now, but it comes from a glorious 
immemorial past from which lessons should be taken. These assumptions draw the road 
maps for the future. The ones who continue to walk on the road are the real Turks of 
Anatolia who can be understood through anthropological quest.  
 
The end of the road, however, is the Great Turkestan for Gök-Börü and some 
official circles during the Second World War. The starting point, on the other hand, is to 
Turkify Anatolia for the Kemalist elite; and to clean non-Turks from Anatolia for Gök-
Börü. This means the Kemalist definition assumes everyone to be Turk, this is 
inclusive; but if not, it tries to make everyone Turk no matter through which means it 
realizes. It supports the means through the use of science and so gains an absolutist 
nature to its assumptions. Gök-Börü uses references to science as well. It justifies 
racism through numbers and measuring. However for Gök-Börü, if a person is not a 
Turk, it cannot be a Turk either. On the other hand, every Muslim living in the 
boundaries of Turkey should ideally be Turks; if they are not accepting this they should 
be made accept. An example may help to understand; for Gök-Börü, Caucasian people 
living in Anatolia or Kurds living in the Eastern part of Anatolia are not Turks, they 
cannot be either; they should be eliminated somehow. For the Kemalist Thesis they are 
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all Turks, who have forgotten their Turkishness; they should be made remember it 
through education and communications. The main reason for this difference is mainly 
resulted from the geographic trauma of Kemalism that the elite lived when they were 
left with Anatolia. However Gök-Börü’s geography is much larger. 
  
 Within that picture both the Kemalists and Gök-Börü writers have this idea of 
superiority of the Turk. The first pushes this in order to have a claim on the Western 
civilization, whereas the latter’s aim is to show that Turks do not need west; they are 
already superior to be able to create the greatest state as before. They both believe that 
Turks was a nation since the very beginning; but for the Kemalists Turks had national 
consciousness except brief periods of crisis which came out because of external threats; 
for the Gök-Börü writers on the other hand, Turks did not have national consciousness, 
that’s why many Turkish states were dissolved. In order to prove all these, they both 
refer to ‘science,’ to the invention of some unchangeable criteria such as blood tie and 
race. 
 
Türkkan claims that depending on physical and psychological characteristics, 
there are eleven races in the world. They are not equal to one another and there are 
differences in terms of abilities and talents.284 Among these races, Tur is the superior285 
and the first one that transformed from monkey into human-being. Its members are 
long, brachycephal, white-skinned, having brown or black hair, aquiline nose, and 
symmetric body. The psychological reflection of these features is that to be brave, 
intelligent, idealist, at the same time spiritualist, heroic, excited, honest, philosopher- 
spirited, very talented in artistic matters and in establishing civilizations. The ‘nations’ 
of Tur are Finns-Uigurs, Japanese, Georgians and Turks. These ‘nations’ mixed with 
other races since the very beginning. The less mixed one and so carrying the most Tur 
blood is the Turks. In that case, the Turks are the superior nation of the Tur race as well 
as of all other nations in the world. Thanks to these talents, Turks established many 
civilizations in the world. These are Sumerians, Hittites, Uigurs, Seljuks and Ottomans. 
The Tur race also influenced other civilizations like Egypt, India, China, Persia, Greek, 
Arabic, and Europe.286  
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Here, it needs to be emphasized is that Türkkan, so Gök-Börü does not claim 
that Turks were the owners of the second group of civilizations above. The Kemalist 
History Thesis, on the other hand, has that big claim of establishing all great 
civilizations in the world, including the ones in the second group. Actually this 
difference displays the basic mentality of Gök-Börü writers and Kemalist elite. The 
Thesis is a civilization-hunger with the anxiety of proving the Turks’ existence not only 
as a nation, but also as a superior nation; not in the future; but also in the past and 
present. Gök-Börü, on the other hand, distinguishes the Turkish rooted civilizations and 
reduces the role of Tur in the formation of non-Turkish civilizations unlike the Kemalist 
Thesis which attributes the Turks the main role. Another point is that while mentioning 
the second group of civilizations, the authors declare that it was the Tur race which 
influenced most of them. In the composition of Tur; there are also Finns-Uigurs, 
Japanese and Georgians. This also reduces the attributed role of Turks on the formation 
of non-Turkish civilizations. 
 
 Türkkan knows that it is impossible to find a pure Turk in Anatolia. In that case, 
he thinks very similar to Gobineau in arguing that the superior race usually mixes with 
others as time passes and this weakens the essence of the superior one. Too much 
mixing is very dangerous for the continuation of civilizations.287 Gök-Börü presents 
‘scientific’ explanations for these dangers by implying that this is ‘scientific racism,’ 
not popular fiction.288 These scientific explanations come from Süreyya Aygün through 
examples of animals. She states that heredity rules determine the characteristics of races 
and continuity of species.289 If these natural rules were not paid attention and if different 
species mix, the result becomes a punishment by the nature. The hybridization leads to 
defects in future generations by creating real bastards.290 Even in the mixture of not very 
different races, the unique characteristics of each race are weakened.291 If hybrids are 
mixed the result even becomes worse and this is sinful in fact.292 However in Europe 
different species are united in order to obtain more powerful ones.293 There may be 
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powerful products at the end, but these would have certain defects such as being 
unproductive or more vulnerable to illnesses.294   
 
Thus, Gök-Börü is in favor of the idea that races are not equal to one another. 
This is anthropologically and zoologically proven by examining the products of two 
different races. When two mix, inappropriate and incapable springs come out. In 
human-beings, this hybridization may appear also as bad habits, tendency to commit 
crimes like prostitution, gambling, burglary. The real disaster, for Gök-Börü writers and 
eugenics, is that these features pass to the next generations. For instance the child of a 
prostitute becomes again a prostitute.295 The Kemalist elite, guided by the motivation of 
Turkifiying Anatolia tried to ‘correct’ these people through various mechanisms of the 
modern state such as the Kurds’ mass conscription296 in the first years of the Republic. 
However for Gök-Börü, these ‘degenerated, dirtied people’ are just lost bastards297 who 
play the biggest role in the corruption and decline of civilizations throughout history.  
 
At this point, very similar to Gobineau’s ideas on the rise and decline of 
civilizations, Türkkan states that the decline of Turkish civilizations came out as the 
result of degeneration of Turkish race.298 For instance, the Ottoman Empire was 
collapsed because of rebellions by those degenerated semi-Turks or non-Turks like the 
rebellions of Janissaries.299 This point is exemplified more in the unfinished novel, 
Kurtların İsyanı (The Rebellion of Wolves) by Mehmet Öztürk. Only the first chapter 
of the novel, which is on the Patrona Halil Rebellion of the eighteenth century, could 
appear since the journal was closed after thirteenth issue. In the chapter; ‘the young, 
handsome, intelligent, excited, and brave’ Turkish pehlivan, the wolf, Mehmed from 
Aydın, defeats Patrona Halil, the ‘rebellious, evil, but coward, Albanian devshirme,’ 
that rebelled right before the campaign to Iran.300  
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The novel also shows that Gök-Börü does not reject the Ottomans entirely; 
instead it chooses the elements of ‘Turkishness’ and the elements of its opposing end; 
‘non-Turkishness.’ In other words, it Turkicizes the Ottoman past; not by referring to 
the dynasty since they are ‘the Ottomans,’ but by referring to the Turkish component of 
the empire. The Turks come to the scene as faithful and loyal warriors as in the case of 
Mehmed pehlivan who fights for the supremacy and integrity of the Ottoman State; not 
for the domination of the dynasty. This portrait is the basis for the warrior of Atsız in 
Deli Kurt, that of Abdullah Ziya Kozanoğlu in Kızıltuğ, and Suat Yalaz’ Karaoğlan 
comics of 1950s and 60s. Here the State is considered to be a supreme entity in a 
Weberian meaning. The warriors fight against any challenges to the State’s supremacy 
and integrity. In that case, the most important one of these challenges come from the 
semi-Turks and the degenerated ones. 
 
A similar example that Türkkan refers is from the War of Independence. 
According to him, during the war these hybrids, degenerated ones wanted to gift 
Turkish homeland to foreigners through mandate. The alien ones claimed the ownership 
of this land although they were just guests.301 Therefore, these dirtied ones along with 
the alien ones challenged the supremacy of the State as they did every time in Turkish 
history. In the same vein, the Kemalist elite discarded the Ottoman Empire since it gave 
the administration to the hands of non-Turks. The difference lies in that Türkkan 
accepts existence of a mixture like Gobineau, however the Kemalist Thesis avoids 
declaring this; therefore takes the Ottoman Empire as if it existed in a dark age, or in a 
universe; so that it failed to harm the ethnic purity of the Turks. In that case, the 
Kemalist elite were much more anxious of not including the Ottomans at any point. 
Gök-Börü meets with the Thesis while searching for the decadence of the Turks; like 
the Kemalist elite who showed the Ottomans as responsible from shadowing Turks’ real 
essence. Türkkan argues that the reason for the backwardness of the Turks is their 
forgetting of Turkishness; although they are racially superior.302 In that picture, the 
passivity of Turkishness is argued by both the Kemalist elite and Gök-Börü writers. 
Besides, it is also argued that despite this passivity, Turks did not lose their specific 
features that make them; the superior race and also superior nation as the Kemalists 
called; the most proper member of the superior Tur race and so the most superior 
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nation, as Gök-Börü writers called. To strip off this conceptual confusion, very basically 
both argue that the Turks are the most superior people of the world, who passed through 
some unlucky times.  
 
Indeed both the Thesis and Gök-Börü externalize the reasons for decadence.  
They use references to external and internal enemies. The internals ones are influenced 
by the external ones. This picture actually creates the convenient basis for conspiracy 
theories, which, in fact, help nations to define themselves in relation to ‘others.’ Here, 
the decadence is related with something alien and different, an external effect. Then the 
classical theory or myth goes as the following; there are some foreign people who want 
to destroy the nation’s essence since they have interests on the homeland of this nation. 
Within that picture, any ideology that challenges to the supremacy of the State is 
considered to be originated by traitors since it is illogical. By this way, nationalization 
of all elements and rising as a homogeneous nation become the only legitimate 
ideology, the life-time mission for a nationalist.  
 
In that case, Gök-Börü sees racism and purifying the country as the sole 
ideology of the Turkish nation. None of other ideologies of the West, including national 
socialism or fascism, can challenge to Turkish racism since they are all alien to the 
Turks. Therefore, Gök-Börü writers argue that they are not imitating national socialism 
or fascism as Jews, communists and masons argued.303 Instead, they are fighting for the 
continuation of thousands of years’ racial element which made Turks superior. While 
giving clues on the ‘others’ of the Turkish racism, this perception of Gök-Börü writers 
actually reveals a very important point; they believed that they are striving for an 
‘immanent’ component of the Turkish nation. In that case with a time difference what 
they argued for can be considered as correct. Nationalism is a modern phenomenon, 
which was accompanied by racism in nation-building. In the Turkish case, racism 
comes as one of the indigenous elements of the nation-building process, as it happened 
in other nationalisms. Therefore, what Gök-Börü writers declare is very enlightening in 
the sense that it shows that racism does not necessarily come into the nation by the 
influence of external factors; such as importation of some ideologies like national 
socialism or racism. Instead, it develops independently as a part of nation-building; but 
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as a subset of what happens in the world. Therefore, of course this does not legitimate 
their actions; but Hitler, Mussolini, or Gök-Börü writers are not a handful of 
adventurers; along with İnönü or Mustafa Kemal, they are part of a larger picture with 
its insides and outsides.  
 
However the classical assumption for the nationalists exemplified by Gök-Börü 
here is that ideologies other than racism have external roots. The picture is drawn like 
this; the ones forget their Turkishness and became westernized import some alien and 
harmful ideologies as the byproducts of westernization. These ideologies like 
communism, internationalism, cosmopolitanism, humanism and egalitarianism are 
superstitions which are resulted from the lack of knowledge on Urukbilig-Raciologie. 
Opposing to the laws of nature, they argue for illogical things such as the common use 
of goods and equality between races, states, and sexes.304 Thus, the supporters of these 
ideologies are all ‘heretics,’305 ‘bastards’ or ‘devshirmes’ who carry bad blood and 
totally forgot the real essence, Turkishness. They are all against national culture, 
national traditions,306 as it is depicted in the caricature by Sadettin Topuzoğlu, they want 
destroy the bridge between past and future307 by making Turkish culture rotten.308  
 
At this point Türkkan, by referring to Gobineau, states that these ‘bastards’ and 
‘aliens’ are also against racism in order to disguise the degeneration of their bloods and 
to generalize this degeneration to everyone including the future generations.309 Besides 
they are enemies of ülkü-ideal,310 therefore as Sofuoğlu adds, the supporters of these 
pernicious ideologies impose their ideas like opium in order to make other people 
indolent individualists who do not have any desire to fight for the ideal of Turkish 
racism.311 In other words, if a race is degenerated so much, after some time it loses its 
ideal and this leads to its collapse. Here as an example, Türkkan gives France, which 
was an ally of Turkey, but defeated right at the beginning of the Second World War. 
According to Türkkan, the collapse of France is mainly the result of this degeneration in 
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its race. This caused the loss of national consciousness,312 and any desire of fighting for 
the French nation. Then France surrendered its flag to the German forces.313   
 
 Within that picture arises the ultimate solution to the decadence; to eliminate all 
foreign elements in the nation not only ideally but also practically through racist 
policies. This would save the Turkish race from more degeneration and reveal the real 
essence of it. The writers of Gök-Börü favor the exclusionary policies of the Kemalist 
elite for their contributions to the rise of Turkish race. The first of these policies is the 
rejection of non-Turks in military schools. Gök-Börü mentions this in a praising way.314 
Very similar to this policy, it was decided by the Kemalist elite that the Ministers of 
Maritime and National Defense would not be allowed to marry to foreigners. This 
policy is also supported by Gök-Börü.315  
 
The most praised and propagated one among those policies is the Wealth Tax 
taken from azlıks-minorities. The justification of this tax is depicted by Yalçın as a 
precondition for saving Turkish economy. According to him, while the Turkish soldiers 
are fighting for protecting the homeland of the Turks, these ‘guests’ dominate the 
market and become rich by profiteering from the war.316 This resulted with the decaying 
of the Turkish market at the hands of degenerated Jews and Armenians, who do not 
even take any responsibility of this. Therefore they should give taxes without 
complaining, they should to this sacrifice.317 If they do not, the Turks will not show 
them tolerance as they did before. They will be punished.318 Indeed, nothing happens if 
a few Solomon is executed. This is even beneficial, because the punishment frightens 
others.319 It is this method of harsh punishment, not communism, made Russia a 
powerful nation. It blocked challenges through pursuing an extremist version of Russian 
nationalism.320 This tax itself was very severe, so not surprisingly, the approach of Gök-
Börü to the Wealth Tax is very militant. The tax again empowers the idea that ‘Turkey 
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is belonged to Turks.’ By naming these non-Muslims as ‘guests,’ whose staying is 
‘tolerated,’ the real owner of Anatolia is implied.   
 
Thus, Gök-Börü writers, like the Kemalist elite are in favor of fighting with all 
these foreign elements. The aim is to elevate the Turkish race by eliminating any 
challenge to its purity. In order for the Turkish race to continue its purity and superiority 
this kind of a struggle is considered to be required.321 The reason for this requirement is 
depicted by Nuri Akgün. From a Social Darwinist and Realist understanding, Akgün 
states that through struggles and fighting, the most capable race is distinguished; then 
nation-states are established. Therefore, not humanism or illusions of peace, it is war 
which protects the sacred presence of a nation since it strengthens national 
consciousness. As the proof of this, Akgün shows the United Nations which failed to 
preserve peace.322 Besides, not being in favor of war indicates the weakening of national 
consciousness. The Turks, on the other hand, are soldiers since they are born because in 
their superior composition, war-making is another inherited talent. War is in their blood, 
so that they are military-nation since the very beginning.323 Therefore they were able to 
establish many different states, because war renovates civilizations.324 In this case, the 
Kemalist elite also refer to bravery of the Turks, but at the same time add that the Turks 
had the tendency of favoring peace. This difference between the understandings of the 
Kemalists and the Gök-Börü writers may be the result of international environment. The 
History Thesis was created at a time when Turks were trying to prove that they did not 
have any irredentist aims like the Ottomans. The Gök-Börü writers, on the other hand, 
actually make propaganda for Turkey’s involving into the Second World War. The 
interesting point is that they were joined by some people of the official circles. This 
glorification of war-making, in fact, justifies the action itself in the eyes of both enemies 
and the ones who fight. It, in a way, presents people a reason to fight while also 
legitimizes the nation’s struggle for existence.  
 
In order to fight, the military-nation needs healthy, disciplined, active, hard-
working and brave nationalist men.325 In Türkkan’s words, “Turkish young man, in 
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tomorrow’s glorious wars, is more frightening than Huns, more enormous than Gök 
Türks, more undefeatable than the soldiers of Chingiz, and more impressive than the 
Ottomans. He is the future god of war.”326 In order to prevent the collapse of this young 
man as in the case of French soldiers who did not have any ideal, he should be passed 
through a national education combined with national discipline.327 This disciplined 
national education should uncover the long-term hidden national consciousness of 
him.328 Then the young man gain national consciousness and by this way he will not 
degenerate his race with hybrid springs. At that point, the authors share the idea that the 
Turkish education system should be reformed in order to re-create this new man.329 
Türkkan, here refers to the education system of Britain in order to display an ideal type 
in which body and mind are educated at the same time. According to his information, 
the British education aims at growing powerful, practical, intelligent, creative, and 
organized persons who are in good shape both physically and mentally.330  
 
The Turkish young man, therefore, should educate both his mind and body since 
he plays the big role in defense of homeland. He should protect his health by practicing 
many types of sports. Ülkütaşır, at that point, introduces these sports that Turks practice 
since the old times; football, boxing, skiing, wrestling, polo, and carid. According to 
him, these ancient Turkish sports are the evidence that Turkish ancestors had already 
grasped the importance of a dual education of body and mind.331 The interesting thing is 
that he actually Turkicizes these games. Abdülkadir İnan contributes by describing 
another game called Gök-Börü, which was played by the Kirghiz Turks.332 Ülkütaşır 
adds that this game was also a common one among the Turks of Anatolia.333 Thus the 
games also serve for showing possible cultural connections with the ‘outside Turks’ 
along with a common geographic reference of the past.  
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This understanding of a dual-sided education is actually an extension of racism’s 
idea that physical characteristics are the determinants of psychological ones. In fact, 
here Türkkan corrects the body and mind of the Turkish young man along with 
instilling the ideal of racism as if it is a religion; because healthy mind is found in the 
health body in Mustafa Kemal’s words. Within this picture of the ideal Turk; religion 
does not occupy much place. Türkkan sees it from an Andersonian side and takes 
national ideal as a substitution for religion as the other writers in the journal who do not 
make any reference to religion. However there are a few translations of Quran suras by 
Besim Atalay and Ömer Rıza Doğrul into Turkish.334 In that case, what they are actually 
against is not the religious loyalty itself, but an Islamic religion which negatively 
influenced Turkish unity since the Turks adopted it. A Turkicized Islam based on purely 
Turkish language or a Turkist religion in Turkish language can be the possible 
alternatives in the authors’ mind.    
 
Furthermore, a secularized education is what they put forward. In that case 
Türkkan’s ideal of a complete education of Turkish youth is actually on the way of 
realizing through Nuri Demirağ Sky School, which is introduced by Gök-Börü in a 
detailed manner. This school was a private one opened for educating pilots in a much 
disciplined way, not only in aviation, but also in various other matters such as 
swimming and using guns. In addition to these psychical qualifications, the school also 
aims at filling the students with national ideal by creating morally proper young men. 
Accordingly, the advices by the owner of the school, Demirağ, go as the following; 
“Turkish young men, avoid all these!: drinking, gambling, dishonesty, laziness, 
shamelessness and cruelty.”335 Türkkan mentions this school in a very much admired 
way firstly because of its contributions to create ideal Turkish youth. The second point 
by Türkkan is that as a Turkish enterprise, the school also contributed to the 
development of national industry. In fact, Nuri Demirağ was also the founder several 
plane-constructing factories.336 With all these, according to Türkkan, Demirağ 
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manifested the intelligence of the Turks to the world, along with his loyalty to the 
national ideal.337 
 
Indeed the creation of a national industry with Turkish enterprises was one of the 
steps of Gök-Börü for the rise of Turkish race. It is stated that Turkish industry should 
be reorganized in order to get rid off bad influences of the war by developing 
indigenous sectors.338 Suggestions for reorganization of agriculture,339and appliance of 
an agricultural insurance340 should also be considered within that framework of 
nationalization for the rise of Turkish race. In fact, then comes the emphasis on villager 
as the symbol of racial purity in a Volkian understanding. What the author writing on 
this issue mainly argues for is the ignorance of villagers in such issues as drinking, 
which may lead to their spiritual collapse.341 Despite this critique, the author praises the 
Turkish villager because of his intelligence as a reaction to the Ottomans which claimed 
exactly the opposite for the villagers because of their laziness.342 The point is that the 
Kemalist project also followed this way of nationalization of industry and agriculture 
while also putting emphasis on the Turkish villager as the spirit of the Turkish race. 
 
Thus, the general vision of Gök-Börü is in favor of nationalization in every 
aspect of life for the rise of Turkish race. To clarify; pure Turkishness in blood, a 
Turkification of language, Turkification of religion, Turkishness in names, clothing, 
sports, architecture, literature, art, music,343 culture, a firm establishment of discipline, 
educating Turkish youth with Turkish mind, muscle and body, so that uncovering the  
brave, heroic, bold, powerful, nationalist, knowledgeable, sportsmen, and fighter 
essence of the young Turkish men. The list by Türkkan continues with Turkish 
education, Turkish cinema, the real Turkish history, national past, national culture, and 
national traditions. Then, not Christmas, but Turkish bayrams will be celebrated. In 
courts, the Turkish law will be adopted. In schools not Greek or Latin, but Gök-Türk 
language and Uighur language should be thought. Persian and Arabic letters should also 
be taught for getting a grasp of history and literature. Of course foreign works will be 
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translated into Turkish, of course some people will also listen European music, but the 
axis will pass through the Turkish side, not through the middle.344 
 
In this picture, Gök-Börü does not completely externalize Islamic and Ottoman 
factors. Even for the language, still Persian and Arabic are emphasized. Unlike the 
Kemalist elite that attempted to remove these elements at the ideological level. The 
main reason that lies behind all these is that Gök-Börü writers, the real Bozkurtçus had 
the claim of presenting a lifetime manual for the Turkish people. The ideal Turk, in fact, 
should also know his past, take lessons from it and then should look to the future with 
the ideal of reaching to the Turan. Therefore he should at first learn his own history by 
returning to the sources, the next step is to think and declare them in Turkish. Here, not 
surprisingly, Gök-Börü does not suggest Greek or Latin; since these are the languages 
of some alien civilizations that the Turks do not have a claim. The Kemalist History 
Thesis, on the other hand, also looked for ancient Greek roots in order to explaining 
Turks’ existence in Anatolia without making any Islamic or Ottoman reference.   
 
 
4.6. The Greater Turkestan- Büyük Birlik Ülküsü: 
 
Within that picture of intensive Turkification, reaching to Turan, the formation 
of Greater Turkestan was considered to be the ultimate aim. However this project was 
not a total unification of the people of the same race. This means the Greater Turkestan 
does not include Magyars, Finns, Georgians, or Japanese although together with the 
Turks they are descended from the race of Tur. Türkkan states that the reason for their 
exclusion is not only the superiority of the Turks; but also the fact that these people do 
not speak Turkish and their traditions are different.345 In that case, Turkish speaking 
people of Russia constitute one of the building blocks of a future unity.    
 
Accordingly, in Gök-Börü ‘the Outside Turks’ is placed with their culture and 
the history of their independence movements. For the cultural aspect, in addition to 
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common sport games, the weddings are depicted in a very much documentarian way.346 
This kind of a discourse may be the result of the future political entity in which Turkey 
would be at the center. Therefore a center-periphery perspective can be realized in-
between lines. In that picture, Turkey is there for saving the ‘imprisoned Turks.’  
Furthermore, the independence movements of ‘Turkish race against Russians 
invasions’ are depicted for showing how they strove for gaining their independence but 
they failed.347 After a general introduction, Bashkurts’ independence movement against 
‘Russian imperialism’ is explained in a very detailed way.348 Then Russians’ policy of 
dividing the Turks and provocating those against one another is declared.349 What the 
authors mainly emphasize is the Russians’ efforts to destroy Turkish unity. In a very 
parallel discourse, Azerbaijan’s history and geography are presented. It begins with the 
etymology of the word Azerbaijan and continues until its invasion by the Soviet Russia. 
It is stressed that the constituting element of Azerbaijan, the Turks, fought for gaining 
independence, however Russians historically repressed even the use of Turkish 
language among them.350   
 
Thus, these depictions, although justifying why these people are ‘imprisoned 
Turks,’ do not include any explicit reference to a possible future project. However in the 
thirteenth issue of Gök-Börü, which was published following the invasion of Azerbaijan 
by Russia, a requiem is presented for this lost land through some articles and poems.351 
Most importantly, Türkkan writes an article in which he outlines all the dangers that the 
Great Turkestan- Büyük Birlik Ülküsü met throughout history. In this article, focusing 
mainly on the invasion of Azerbaijan by Russia, Türkkan argues that Turkishness 
succeeded to survive despite the efforts to divide Turks and then degenerate Turkish 
blood. Although at the end of the article he declares that he and his followers’ aim is a 
cultural rapprochement,352 this does not seem so. Combined with the other writings in 
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the issue, this article was actually a call for war. Türkkan’s sentence on cultural union 
might be the result of the government’s rising reactions following the defeat of 
Germany by the Soviet Union in Stalingrad. In fact this issue, chiefly the article by 
Türkkan, created enormous disturbance among the government circles. As a result, 
Gök-Börü was closed353 for preventing any reaction by the Soviet Russia. 
 
However the flow of journals did not end. Kopuz became more political-focused. 
Türk-Sazı appeared as another Pan-Turkist journal which gathered Pan-Turkists under 
its roof. This continued until 1944 when the diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union 
gained prominence in order to prevent its aggressiveness. On the other hand, as the 
influence of Soviet Union increased, the Pan-Turkist journals became very severe anti-
communists. Their reactions became concretized with an extensive Pan-Turkist meeting 
of 1944 after which all of above-mentioned names were litigated except the old retired 
generals Ali İhsan Sabis and Hüseyin Hüsnü Emir Erkilet. Ironically, the litigated Pan-
Turkists defended themselves through an extensive survey of all the racist policies and 
discourses of the Kemalist elite. However they were imprisoned in 1944 with the claim 
of pursuing a racist understanding of Turkishness. The peculiarity is that these Pan-
Turkists were released in 1947 when they persuaded the court that what they did was 
actually to defense Turkish nation’s interests against the non-Turk communists.354 This 
result is a concretization of that there are ideological penetrations between two versions 
of Turkish nationalism independently from foreign policy; they are in fact fertilized by 
the same intellectual sources and same myths like ‘non-national aliens.’ In other words, 
‘nationalism’ again defeated ‘non-national, alien.’ 
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CONCLUSION: 
 
 
“THE PAST IS A FOREIGN COUNTRY...355” 
 
“Thus grew the tale of Wonderland: 
                                                                                                                   Thus slowly, one by one, 
                                                                                                                Its quaint events were hammered out- 
                                                                                                                And now the tale is done, 
                                                                                                                And home we steer, a merry crew, 
                                                                                                                                                  Beneath the setting sun.” 
                                                                                                                 
                                                                                                              Down the Rabbit Hole, in Alice in Wonderland 
 
 
Nationalism has enough space of freedom for imagining a glorious past by 
selecting evidence, magnifying the realities or by just recreating in a wonderland. In that 
context, since the past has already gone, it was like a foreign country in which the 
nation-builders try to follow the traces of future. This is in a way to project future to the 
present. Then the findings by the nationalists are absolutized and become myths with 
proofs of pseudo-science. The next step is the dissemination of this imagination through 
communications or education. There may emerge reactions to this anonymity, but they 
are repressed with the totalitarian State which holds all the powers of narrating the past 
by monopolizing intellectual production. At that point, any alternative ideology was 
considered as challenges to the supremacy and integrity of the State. 
 
 The newly born Turkish nation-state passed through exactly the same process of 
invention. It was actually a part of the largest project which had already begun with the 
self-definition attempts of the Ottomans in order to find a solution to the dissolution of 
the empire. The sources that they had were mostly the European sources. Therefore they 
began to see themselves through European eyes. This was accompanied by the rise of a 
separate Pan-Turkist movement in the Russian dominated lands, which pushed for a 
possible unification of all the Turks. On the other hand, the Ottoman intellectuals had 
already worn that European glasses and begun to look for roots.  
                                                 
355
 First line of the book The Go-Between by L.P. Hartley, 1953. 
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The War of Independence gave birth to a different kind of attachment for the 
people of Anatolia other than religion or the failed project of Ottoman citizen. However 
this did not continue for so long, after the war has finished and the borders were defined 
the mission was completed. Thus, When the Turkish Republic had been declared in 
1923, Muslims living in Anatolia were not defining themselves as the Turks, but as 
Muslims of Anatolia. The 1930s, then, came with a creation of Turkishness through a 
rediscovering of its roots. The product of these efforts was the Turkish History Thesis 
which was prepared with several considerations such as anti-Islamicization and anti-
Ottomanization. Therefore the Kemalist elite took the roots of Turks back to Central 
Asia in order to claim antiquity and non-Islamic origins which were at the same time 
secular. By this way, the Thesis claimed that the Turks was an ancient nation which had 
established many states. This Thesis actually served for westernization project through 
stripping the ‘nation’ off its barbaric and religious image while at the same time 
‘proving’ that Turks were as talented as Europeans in establishing civilizations. Then a 
mass pumping of Central Asian roots came through education and communications 
mediums in the same vein with many racist and exclusive policies of the government.  
  
 On the other hand, the Kemalist elite’s claim for westernization met with several 
reactions. Some other nationalists argued that the Turks do not need that European 
claim in order to prove their greatness. Indeed, Gök-Börü came as a reaction to 
Kemalists’ claim for westernization during the Second World War when Germany was 
making extensive Pan-Turkist propaganda. There are three main tenets that defined 
Gök-Börü’s discourse. The very first was that Gök-Börü was published by Reha Oğuz 
Türkkan who passed through a Kemalist education. The other contributors were also 
mostly professors, teachers, students and librarians. The second is that Gök-Börü 
witnessed the ongoing dispute between two leaders of the Pan-Turkist movements. 
When compared with the second leader, Nihal Atsız, Türkkan was closer to the center 
also with the influence of his father’s official position. The third point is that it was 
already an aggressive period which incited new hopes for taking the Central Asian lands 
and realizing the aim of reaching to Turan.  
 
Despite its Pan-Turkist emphasis, Gök-Börü could find various conciliation 
points with the Kemalist regime. The reason behind this was that both the Kemalist 
History Thesis and Gök-Börü were shaped by similar concerns of nation-building. 
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Therefore, they employed same themes, same myths, and same images. Of course, Gök-
Börü had also the consideration of continuing its life as a journal, it was not uneasy for 
it to fit into the Kemalist discourse or vice versa. The result was a symbiotic 
relationship between the two, which taken together, created a complex nationalist 
discourse. 
 
Indeed although their ultimate ends were different, both had similar definition 
for Turkishness which mainly based on the ultimate mission of nationalization and 
excluding all other un-national elements. This commonality revealed that nation-
building discourses are mostly established on some assumptions and otherizations. 
Therefore, neither the racist face of Kemalist discourse, nor the racist journal Gök-Börü 
was anomalies. In the larger context, they were the products of the age of nationalisms.  
 
However, nation-building can never be completed. States have to make people 
remembered themselves through various means. In that context, Turkish nationalism is 
also an unfinished project which meets with several crisis because of its absolutization 
of the ‘nation,’ State and nationalism solely to the Turks. Thus, new mixtures, different 
conciliations are still waiting to be explored for creating collective memories. 
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